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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KNOW
By David Mitchell Ivester*
Introduction
Americans pride themselves on being a self-governing people. They
have always believed that the right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered from a multitude of minds and ideas than from any authoritarian
selection. "To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all." 1 Indispensable to the continued success of our two hundred
year old experiment in self-government is a free flow of information upon
which individuals can make reasoned judgments. In any political system,
those who make the decisions must have access to information upon which
to base their decisions. Although pure democracy and an absolutely free
flow of information are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, the practical
relationship between the two nevertheless remains unchanged. To the extent
that a system shares responsibility for decisionmaking, information must
also be shared.
Americans thus have a vital interest in acquiring information about
their society, their government, the world, indeed, about any matter that will
affect their lives. Recent controversies involving the Pentagon Papers,
Watergate, executive privilege, congressional scandals, and secret govern-
ment operations have aroused considerable public concern that the people
are not being told that which they have a right to know. At the same time,
there is a sense of uneasiness about the government's ability to keep secret
all that should remain secret.
The right to know, as posited in this note, is a constitutional right,
independent of parallel statutory and common law doctrines.' Included
within its purview are the rights to receive information from willing sources,
to gather information from willing or neutral sources, and to acquire infor-
mation from a perhaps unwilling governmental source. 3 The right to know is
© David Mitchell Ivester, 1977.
* Member, third year class.
1. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(Learned Hand, J.).
2. For a discussion of statutory and common law rights of access to and inspection
of government information, see H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953);
Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971
(1975).
3. To know means to be cognizant of, to be acquainted with, or to have a concept
of in the mind. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (P. Gove
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not absolute; rather, this note suggests that, like other important First
Amendment rights, it should be limited only when necessary to further a
compelling state interest.
Section I of this note briefly examines, in light of current political
conditions, the role of a free flow of information in maintaining the system
of checks and balances that characterizes the United States government.
Within this perspective, the note explores the relatively undeveloped con-
cept of the right of the people to know about their government and its
activities. Section II focuses on the doctrinal and constitutional basis of the
right, deferring to Section IV consideration of the ultimate scope of the
right. Section III reviews the present status of governmental, most impor-
tantly judicial, recognition of the right to know. Section IV outlines the
limits of the right, explores the government's power to withhold informa-
tion, and discusses the appropriate elements of any test or standard used to
determine what should remain secret and what should be available to the
people. Section V then discusses the role of the judiciary in effectuating the
constitutional right to know.
I. Perspective: Balance in the American
Political System
In contrast to an authoritarian government comprised of two distinct
groups, the governors and the governed, a self-governing society is com-
posed of only the self-governing people; rulers and ruled are the same
ed. 1971). Freedom of speech, freedom of information, the right to receive information,
the right to gather information, and the right of access to government information are all
related to, and part of, the right to know, but it is the desired end "to know" that is
important. Only with knowledge can the people truly have a will to which the government
can be accountable. The right to know, like all enduring constitutional principles, cannot
be defined as if it were only a word in a dictionary. It must be allowed to grow and
evolve with the circumstances. Perhaps at one time the right to receive information from
an unrestrained press was adequate; in a more complex society the right to know may
impose upon government an affirmative duty actively to inform the public even in the
absence of prior requests for information. See Note, Access to Government Information
and the Classification Process -Is There a Right to Know?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814, 831-32
(1971). For further definition of terms, see J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECREcY 3-4
(1956) [hereinafter cited as WIGGINS]; Forkosch, Freedom of Information in the United
States, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 10-22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Forkosch]; Note, The
Public's Right of Access to Government Information under the First Amendment, 51
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 164, 165-68 (1974).
For a discussion focusing on the nature of the source, whether willing, unwilling, or
neutral (i.e., places and events), see Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to
Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974) (concluding that there is no right to
acquire information from an unwilling source).
This note focuses on the right to know about the workings and activities of the fed-
eral government, but much of the same analysis can be applied to a correlative right re-
garding state and local governments.
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individuals.4 Such a governmental system rests on a compact in which the
people assume all authority to exercise control, yet agree that all alike are
subject to control. Further, although established and maintained by the
consent of the citizens, this government must have independent power to
compel all citizens to obey the laws.5 How then, in the interest of liberty, is
such a government itself to be controlled? The American response has been
twofold: first, the government must be designed as a self-regulating system;
second, the people, apart from the government, must exercise their inaliena-
ble power to oversee and discipline the government.
6
The self-regulating design of the United States government is based on
the concept of a balance of power. The founding fathers recognized that
man, often motivated by self-interest and thus susceptible to corruption, is
generally untrustworthy.' Absolute power could be entrusted to no one. The
federal government was therefore divided into three branches, each with its
own sphere of power and interest and each with some means to check the
power of the others. The aim was, by means of the balanced tension, to
prevent the exercise of arbitrary power by any one branch or by the system
as a whole.8 The constitutional division of power between the federal and
state governments serves much the same purpose.9
The second basic check on the government rests on the principle that
the people are sovereign. The people, in exercising their inherent power to
make and unmake governments, delegated certain powers to governmental
4. See, e.g., F. GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITU-
TIONS 12-13, 627-40 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GRIMKE]; A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 3-16 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
FREE SPEECH].
5. FREE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 9. See also, Schlesinger, Civil Disobedience:
The Problem of Selective Obedience to Law, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 947 (1976).
6. "In framing a government, which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity
of auxiliary precautions." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 399 (J. Hamilton ed. 1904) (A.
Hamilton). See id. Nos. 47-51; GRIMKE, supra note 4, at 12-13, 627-40; J. LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 118-19, 382-85 (P. Laslett ed. 1964); C. MERRIAM,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 74-83 (1906); J. POMEROY, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 85-91,
165-87 (1879).
7. See C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 371-72 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as ROSSITER].
8. "The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose
was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribu-
tion of governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autoc-
racy." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976).
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authorities while reserving to themselves all remaining rights and powers.1"
From the outset, then, the national government was one of limited powers;
the Bill of Rights imposed further limitations. Power thus is divided not only
between the branches of government, but also between the government and
the people. Here, too, must be a balance that allows the people effectively to
oversee the operation of the government.1
This dual balance of power is threatened today by two interrelated
phenomena: first, the tremendous growth of the federal government as a
whole, and second, the gradually expanding power of the executive branch
and relative diminution of the power of Congress.2 The federal govern-
ment, and particularly the executive branch, in 1977 stands in a much more
powerful position vis-a-vis the people and the states than it did in 1789.13
One important factor in the development of that power has been the execu-
tive's possession and control of vast amounts of information relating to
government activities.14 Not only is the executive, the President and his
many agency officials and employees, in a position to gather information,
but that branch generates much of the information itself. 5
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The power to make and unmake governments refers
not to the power to elect a new Congress and President, but to the revolutionary power to
change the entire governmental system and structure.
11. See M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-10 (1963). See also note 6
supra.
12. See A. LEWIS, Introduction to NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT
SECRECY IN AMERICA 13-14 (N. Dorsen & S. Gillers ed. 1974); Kalijarvi & Wallace,
Executive Authority to Impose Prior Restraint upon Publication of Information Concern-
ing National Security Affairs: A Constitutional Power, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 468, 469
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Kalijarvi & Wallace].
13. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS (1957); A.
SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) [hereinafter cited as
SCHLESINGER].
14. Ervin, Secrecy in a Free Society, 213 THE NATION 454, 455 (1971); Horton,
The Public's Right to Know, 3 N.C. CENT. L.J. 123, 129-30 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Horton]; Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the
Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 11 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Parks]. See
also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38-39
(1963) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON]; HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES,
H.R. REP. No. 2947, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 81-83, 88-89 (1956); B. LADD, CRISIS IN
CREDIBILITY 220-21 (1968); Mathias, Executive Privilege and Congressional Responsi-
bility in Foreign Affairs, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 69-80 (T. Franck and E.
Weisband ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Mathias]; Gillers, Secret Government and What
to Do about It, 1 CIV. LIB. REV. 68 (Winter/Spring 1974); Kutner, Freedom of Informa-
tion: Due Process of the Right to Know, 18 CATH. LAW. 50, 52-53 (1972); Murphy,
Knowledge is Power: Foreign Policy and Information Interchange Among Congress, the
Executive Branch, and the Public, 49 TUL. L. REV. 505-10 (1975); Comment, The First
Amendment and the Public Right to Information, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 93, 94 (1973).
15. Of necessity, the executive has expanded its capacity to handle this informa-
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The executive exercises control over the information in its possession
in a number of ways. Information has been withheld under claim of execu-
tive privilege,16 under the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act,"7
and on the basis of the classification system. 8 Other less formal devices
include losing, hiding, or destroying information, foot-dragging in response
to requests for information, and evasiveness in answering questions; 9 on
occasion government officials have resorted to lying. 2' The flow of informa-
tion is controlled not only by such withholding techniques, but by the
practice of feeding information'to Congress and the public through "leaks"
and "background reports."
21
Adequate and accurate information about the government and other
matters is not usually available in the public domain or within Congress
itself.22 Because the information upon which the public and Congress are so
dependent lies largely within the executive branch, 23 the power of the execu-
tive to withhold and to control its flow assumes a position of primary
tion. It is only through the use of modem information systems that the President and vari-
ous department heads are able to steer the vast ship of state at all. Congress, on the other
hand, has not sufficiently increased its capacity to handle information, neglecting even to
avail itself of electronic computer technology until 1967 when it installed its first compu-
ter. By this time the executive was already operating 2,500 computers of its own. B.
LADD, CRISIS IN CREDIBILITY 222 (1968).
16. See generally R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
MYTH (Bantam ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BERGER]; A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by 5 U.S.C.A. § 552
(West Supp. 4, pt. 1, 1976). For further discussion of the Freedom of Information Act,
see notes 155-58, 218-20 and accompanying text infra.
18. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974) reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(Supp. V 1975).
19. See, e.g., THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, MEDIA AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY 37-47 (1973); NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS-
GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA (N. Dorsen & S. Gillers ed. 1974);
SCHLESINGER, supra note 13 at 331-76.
20. See D. WISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING-GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SE-
CRECY, AND POWER (1973).
21. See notes 19 & 20 supra.
22. Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47
CALIF. L. REV. 3, 11 (1959). See notes 29-32 infra.
23. "The executive branch is, among other things, one of the more enormous in-
formation gathering machines ever devised by man. The Congress, on the other hand, in
carrying out its unique responsibilities for assisting the President in the conduct of foreign
policy must rely for information partly upon what it reads in the papers, partly upon what
it can get from experts outside government, but most of all upon what the executive
branch chooses to tell it." Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the
Executive: Hearing on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Se-
nate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971) (statement of Senator
Mathias).
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importance.24 The potency of such a power lies in its pervasive yet totally
flexible character. This power can be exercised on a day-to-day basis and
may be molded to meet the needs of many different situations. The more
obvious constitutional checks, such as the veto, the franchise, or the power
of the purse, seem rather clumsy by comparison.25 The executive, then,
possesses a very usable power capable of producing serious imbalances in
the American constitutional system.
Secrecy is not always a source of power; it has debilitating effects on
the executive branch as well as on government as a whole. Traditional
intrabranch rivalries have led to information hoarding, creating possible
power imbalances within the executive branch itself." Noted historian
Henry Steele Commager, contrasting the ideals of the founders with the
current political condition of the American republic, has expressed concern
that secrecy has so clogged the machinery of government that even top
decisionmakers occasionally operate in ignorance:
The generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government one
of the instruments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the
principle that a democracy cannot function unless the people are permit-
ted to know what their government is up to. Now almost everything that
the Pentagon and the CIA do is shrouded in secrecy. Not only are the
American people not permitted to know what they are up to but even the
Congress and, one suspects, the President (witness the 'unauthorized'
bombing of the North last fall and winter) are kept in darkness."
II. Foundations of the Right to Know
While maintenance of a balance of power between the branches of
government is important, the balance between the people and the govern-
ment is crucial.28 The people's right to know about governmental affairs
holds great potential for counteracting the power that the executive enjoys as
a result of its possession and control of information. To understand the
24. Parks, supra note 14, at 2-3, 11; Developments in the Law-The National Se-
curity Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1190, 1209-10, 1216 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-National Security]. See Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 94-95 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); BERGER, supra
note 16, at 2-3, 249-51, 346-47.
25. See Mathias, supra note 14, at 80-83.
26. T. Franck & E. Weisband, Introduction: Executive Secrecy in Three Democ-
racies: The Parameters of Reform, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 8-9 (T. Franck &
E. Weisband ed. 1974).
27. Commager, The Defeat of America, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 5, 1972, at 7.
28. "[The measure of a good constitution is not simply the form of government
but the effectiveness of the process by which the people out of government are constantly
able to discipline government by exercising the inalienable power xhich ultimately sanc-
tions all governments." J. Ward, Introduction to GRIMKE, supra note 4, at 12. See Gros-
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
The balance between people and government is particularly important in the areas of
national security and foreign affairs: "In the absence of the governmental checks and bal-
[Vol. 4
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nature and scope of the people's right to know, which has remained a largely
undeveloped area of constitutional law, it is necessary to explore the doctri-
nal foundations as well as any governmental recognition of the right.
A. Political Foundations: Functioning Self-Government, Popular
Sovereignty, and Limited Power with Correlative Right
The first foundation of the right to know flows from a functional
analysis of democratic systems of government. Self-government is possible
only to the extent that the leaders of the state are responsible and responsive
to the will of the people. But if the will of the people is to have validity, if
the people are to function as a rational electorate, they must have adequate
knowledge of what the government is doing."9 Without such knowledge the
people can neither participate effectively in governmental processes3 nor
ances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive
policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an
enlightened citizenry-in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here
protect the values of democratic government." New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). See T. Franck & E. Weisband, Dis-
semblement, Secrecy, and Executive Privilege in the Foreign Relations of Three Democ-
racies: A Comparative Analysis, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 401-02 (T. Franck
& E. Weisband ed. 1974). See also note 6 supra.
29. "When men govern themselves it is they-and no one else-who must pass
judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. . . . Just so far as, at any point,
the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opin-
ion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of
the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government. . . .It is a deduction from the basic American agreement
that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." FREE SPEECH, supra note 4,
at 26-27 (emphasis in original).
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713-15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95,
102 (1940); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1936). See also
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-77 (1964); id. at 296-97 (Black, J.,
concurring); N. ANGELL, THE PRESS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY 17
(1922); H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 128-32 (1953); WIGGINS, supra
note 3, at ix, 19; Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1, 14; Hennings, Constitutional Law: The People's Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J.
667, 668 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hennings]; Horton, supra note 14, at 123; Parks,
supra note 14, at 3-4; Rogers, The Right to Know Government Business from the View-
point of the Government Official, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 83 (1956); Yankwich, Legal Impli-
cations of, and Barriers to, The Right to Know, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 3, 33-36 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Yankwich]; Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Con-
stitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Access to Official Infor-
mation]; Comment, The First Amendment and the Public Right to Information, 35 U.
PITT. L. REV. 93 (1973).
30. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
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hold the government accountable for its actions.31 The right to know is
inherent in the proper functioning of a system of self-government. 2 The
people's right to know also facilitates the proper performance of the legisla-
tive function. As a representative legislative body, Congress is properly
responsive to and dependent upon public opinion. To the extent that the right
to know will result in a fully informed public no longer dependent upon
information gratuitously provided by the executive, Congress will have a
more solid political base from which to perform its legislative duties and to
fulfill its role in the balance of power within the federal government.
33
A second foundation, often associated with the functional argument but
actually theoretically distinct, is that the right to know is implicit in the
structure of a self-governing system. The sovereign people, by virtue of
their station as the fundamental source of all governmental power, have an
inherent right to know what their government is doing."4 That right is im-
plicit in the inalienable power of the people to make and unmake govern-
64, 74-75 (1964). See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967); Whitney v. Cali-
fomia, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); WIGGINS, supra note 3,
at 19-20; Parks, supra note 14, at 3-4; Yankwich, supra note 29, at 33; Note, The Na-
tional Security Exception to The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV.
214, 223 (1971).
31. "When the people do not know what their government is doing, those who
govern are not accountable for their actions-and accountability is basic to the democratic
system. By using devices of secrecy, the government attains the power to 'manage' the
news and through it to manipulate public opinion." Ervin, Secrecy in a Free Society, 213
THE NATION 454, 456 (1971), quoted in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640-41
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863-64
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296-97 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). See
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 102-03 (1940).
32. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-41 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 725-28
(Stewart, J., dissenting). See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 860-64
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 41-44 (1971);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See also note 29 supra.
33. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 385-88; Parks, supra note 14, at 4.
For example, it was evident during the impeachment process of President Nixon that
Congress, far from taking the lead in the impeachment drive, required considerable public
support before it would take any definitive action. In this case the revelations to the public
were more important to the proper fulfillment of the congressional role than any revela-
tions to Congress alone could have been.
34. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-41 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713-15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640-41 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-76 (1964); Ervin, A Survey on Government and the
Freedom of Information, Controlling Executive Privilege, 20 Loi'. L. REV. 11 (1974);
Hennings, supra note 29, at 668-69 (this article also connects the theoretical rationales for
the right to know to various constitutional provisions). See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 487-88 (1957); Parks, supra note 14, at 7.
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ments. It is a right that was not expressly forfeited when the people dele-
gated powers to the government; nor, in view of the necessity of the right to
the proper functioning of the system,35 should it be assumed that the right
was impliedly forfeited.36 Logically, then, the right to know is one of those
constitutionally protected unenumerated rights retained by the people."
The third foundation of the right employs the theories of pppular
sovereignty and government by compact, but goes beyond the notion that
the right to know is inherent in these ideas. Dr. Wallace Parks, in an early
study of the constitutional right to know,38 suggests that the right should be
recognized as a corollary to the government's limited power to withhold
information.39 Such a power is nowhere expressly authorized or defined, but
Parks observes:
Whatever powers the President and Congress have to withhold in-
formation are derived, of course, from the powers entrusted to them by
the Constitution. In view of the theory of popular sovereignty and of
reserved powers and the fact that Members of Congress . . . and the
President [are] elected by the people . . . , it would be extraordinary if
the powers granted to the President or to the Congress were to authorize
the general withholding of information needed for a responsible exercise
of the franchise. "Nothing could be more irrational than to give the
people power, and to withhold from them information without which
power maybe abused."["]. . . It is reasonable to assert, therefore, that
only a limited power to withhold government information can be derived
from Articles I and II of the Constitution even apart from the Bill of
Rights.
41
Given that the government's withholding power is limited, Parks continues:
"There are practical if not theoretical weaknesses, however, to power limi-
tations which are not matched by correlative rights located in individuals,
associations or corporate entities capable of asserting them when they are
infringed.' '42
These weaknesses find their remedy in a right to know, "residing in the
non-governmental community which [is] abridged if the President and the
Congress should exceed their constitutional powers in withholding informa-
35. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
36. See Parks, supra note 14, at 7.
37. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
38. Parks, supra note 14.
39. Id. at 7-8.
40. Parks did not footnote this quotation, but it corresponds, with the exception of
a minor preposition, to Wiggins, The Role of the Press in Safeguarding the People's
Right to Know Government Business, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 74, 78 (1956) (paraphrasing 4
T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 347 (1850-1861)).
41. Parks, supra note 14, at 7 (footnotes omitted). This rationale does not, how-
ever, take into account the possibility of extra-constitutional powers. See notes 182-87,
210 and accompanying text infra.
42. Parks, supra note 14, at 7. Footnote 8 of Parks' article illustrates the point:
"For example, if we assume that President Jefferson exceeded his powers in agreeing to
the Louisiana Purchase, whose rights were infringed?"
Winter 1977]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tion." 43 The right is textually grounded, if such is necessary, in the Ninth
Amendment's reminder that "enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." 44
B. Constitutional Foundation: First Amendment
The fourth foundation is also the primary textual basis for the constitu-
tional right to know. The First Amendment contains the limiting prohibition
that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . . . ." Read literally, this provision may be interpreted to
mean that only one's freedom to speak or to publish is protected by the
Constitution. Apparently then, one would have a right only to inform and
not to be informed.46 But if the rights to speak, to publish, and to inform are
more than theoretical ideals, certain implied rights must logically flow even
from this strict construction.4" These implied rights include the rights to
receive and gather information and to have access to sources of information
in order thereafter to be able to inform.4" The First Amendment is not the
guardian of mere "talkativeness"; 49 its aim is "to prepare the people for an
intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens."5 Knowledge and the means
of acquiring it are thus necessary prerequisites to the intelligent and effective
exercise of the rights to speak and publish.
I. Intent of the Founding Fathers
The literal interpretation enunciated in the preceding paragraph is ne-
gated by the intent of the founding fathers, by the overall purpose of the First
43. Id. at 8.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Parks also finds textual support for the right to know
in the First and Fifth Amendments. Parks, supra note 14, at 8-13.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. While this appears to be only a limitation on the exer-
cise of legislative power, the First Amendment has generally been assumed to apply to all
branches of government. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
254, 486 n.7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN].
46. See Forkosch, supra note 3, at 36-37.
47. Id.; 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 341, 342 (1971). See Access to Official Informa-
tion, supra note 29, at 218-19. But see Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to With-
hold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273-77 (1971);
Kalijarvi & Wallace, supra note 12, at 474-80; Mayo, Comments Concerning the First
Amendment and the People's Right to Know, in UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW
SCHOOL SUMMER INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW,
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA LEGAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS 6-11 (1954).
48. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775-76 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-28 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 102-03 (1940); Forkosch, supra note 3, at 36-37; 47 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 341, 342 (1971).
49. FREE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 25.
50. 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (8th ed. 1927).
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Amendment, and by the very idea of government embodied in the Constitu-
tion.51 Although the quest for the intent of the framers is fraught with
perils,52 it can reasonably be said that some recognition and protection of the
right to know was contemplated or presumed by many of those who partici-
pated in the process of producing the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
Indeed there is some evidence suggesting that the founding fathers intended
to guarantee the right to know per se, that is, that the First Amendment was
specifically intended to extend to the people a directly enforceable right to
know about governmental affairs.13 If, perhaps, this specific intent did not
enter the minds of most of the framers, there is persuasive evidence, in light
of the widespread awareness of the basic need for "popular information, or
the means of acquiring it," 54 that the freedom of speech and press clauses
were intended at least as instrumental means of securing and protecting the
right to know. 5 In other words, assuming the framers had no intent to create
a directly enforceable right to know, they expected that the guarantee of
freedom of speech and press would effectively secure the right of the people
to know about their government.
51. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 95-96 (1948); Forkosch, supra note 3, at 38-46. The Supreme Court has
generally construed the Constitution liberally, especially provisions for the security of per-
sons. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886). It has also recognized that certain basic rights, although not expressly mentioned
in the Constitution, are nevertheless constitutionally protected. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1968) (right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964)
(right to privacy).
52. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING-CASES
AND MATERIALS 139-45 (1975).
53. See notes 56-63 and accompanying text infra.
54. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in THE COMPLETE
MADISON 337 (S. Padover ed. 1953). See note 65 infra. See also Forkosch, supra note
3, at 38-46; Hennings, supra note 29, at 668-70; Wiggins, Government Operations and
the Public's Right to Know, 19 FED. B.J. 62-64 (1959).
55. See notes 70-96 and accompanying text infra.
Judge Cooley's interpretation of constitutional history also leads to the conclusion
that the First Amendment accords protection not only to dissemination, but to acquisition
of information as well: "To guard against repressive measures by the several departments
of the government, by means of which persons in power might secure themselves and
their favorites from just scrutiny and condemnation, was the general purpose [of the First
Amendment.] . . .The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely,
but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and gen-
eral discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an
intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 885-86 (8th ed. 1927). See also Forkosch, supra note 3, at 38-46;
Hennings, supra note 29, at 669; Parks, supra note 14, at 7; Wiggins, Government Oper-
ations and the Public's Right to Know, 19 FED. B.J. 62, 63-64 (1959).
But for an historical analysis that concludes that "[tihe persistent image of colonial
America as a society in which freedom of expression was cherished is an hallucination of
sentiment that ignores history," see L. LEVY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 18 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as LEVY]. Note, however, that Levy's study focuses on the meaning of
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a. Evidence of specific intent to embody the right to know in the First
Amendment
The debate on the Bill of Rights during the ratification controversy
provides little insight into the meaning of freedom of speech and press at that
time.56 The sentiments of certain individuals influential in shaping the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights, expressed prior to the ratification of the First
Amendment in 1791, however, indicate that to these individuals freedom of
speech and press included some protection of a right to be informed about
governmental affairs.57 As early as 1722 Benjamin Franklin argued:
The Administration of Government is nothing else but the Attendance of
the Trustees of the People upon the Interest and Affairs of the People:
And as it is the Part and Business of the People, for whose Sake alone all
publick Matters are, or ought to be transacted, to see whether they be
well or ill transacted; so it is the Interest, and ought to be the Ambition,
of all honest Magistrates, to have their Deeds openly examined, and
publickly scan'd .... 58
In 1787, following Shay's Rebellion, Thomas Jefferson noted that the
people, "the only censors of their governors," may be led astray momentar-
ily, but will soon correct themselves:
The way to prevent these [errors] of the people is to give them full
information of their affairs thro' the channel of the public papers, and to
contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very
first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspap-
ers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter.59
freedom of speech and press vis-a-vis the law of libel and does not purport to confront the
question of the right to know. This difference in focus can significantly affect one's result-
ing impression. For example, Levy offers James Wilson as a prime example of an influen-
tial founding father who retained the Blackstonian idea that freedom of the press meant
only freedom from prior restraints (id. at 201-02), yet the same James Wilson stood up
before the Constitutional Convention to make one of the most unequivocal declarations of
the people's right to know. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text infra.
56. See LEVY, supra note 55, at 214-15.
57. See RosSITER, supra note 7, at 385.
58. 2 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 26-27 (A. Smyth ed. 1907).
Franklin's argument, made under the pseudonym "Silence Dogood" and offered as an
Abstract from the London Journal, is a quotation of the most famous of Cato's Letters,
Of Freedom of Speech: That the same is inseparable from Publick Liberty, originally pub-
lished in London in 1720 and conveniently reprinted in abridged form in THE ENGLISH
LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE: FROM THE WRITINGS OF JOHN TRENCHARD AND THOMAS
GORDON 38-44 (D. Jacobson ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN
HERITAGE]. For a description and further discussion of Cato's Letters, see notes 74, 78,
82 infra.
59. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, in 11 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (Boyd ed. 1955). In a letter to John Tyler in 1804,
Jefferson wrote: "No experiment can be more interesting than that we are now trying, and
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In 1789, two years before ratification of the First Amendment, the
Chief Justice of Massachusetts, William Cushing, addressed a letter to John
Adams inquiring about the meaning of the state constitution's free press
clause, which had originally been drafted by Adams." While they were
primarily concerned with the questions whether subsequent as well as previ-
ous restraints on the press were prohibited and whether truth was a proper
defense against a charge of seditious libel, close examination of the
Cushing-Adams correspondence indicates that both men understood and
interpreted freedom of the press to include a freedom or right to know about
governmental affairs."
which we trust will end in establishing the fact, that man may be governed by reason and
truth. Our first object should therefore be, to leave open to him all the avenues to truth.
The most effectual hitherto found, is the freedom of the press. It is, therefore, the first
shut up by those who fear the investigation of their actions." THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 576 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944).
60. Article 16 of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 provided: "The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state;
it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth." 3 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 1892
(F. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as THORPE].
61. Letters of William Cushing and John Adams, 27 MASS. L.Q. 12-16 (Oct.
1942), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 147-53 (L.
Levy ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM OF THE PRESS]. After noting that the
traditional Blackstonian concept of liberty of the press consisted only in laying no previ-
ous restraints upon publications, Cushing wrote: "But the words of our article understood
according to plain English, make no such distinction, and must exclude subsequent re-
straints, as much as previous restraints. In other words, if all men are restrained by the
fear of jails, scourges and loss of ears from examining the conduct of persons in adminis-
tration and where their conduct is illegal, tyrannical and tending to overthrow the Con-
stitution and introduce slavery, are so restrained from declaring it to the public that will
be as effectual a restraint as any previous restraint whatever.
"The question upon this article is this-What is that liberty of the press, which is
essential to the security of freedom? The propagating of literature and knowledge by print-
ing or otherwise tends to illuminate men's minds and to establish them in principles of
freedom. But it cannot be denied also, that a free scanning of the conduct of administra-
tion and shewing the tendency of it, and where truth will warrant, making it manifest that
it is subversive of all law, liberty and the Constitution; it can't be denied. I think that the
liberty tends to the security of freedom in a State; even more directly and essentially than
the liberty of printing upon literary and speculative subjects in general." Id. at 14.
Adams, concerned with jury tial in libel cases, replied: "The difficult and important
question is whether the Truth of words can be admitted by the court to be given in evi-
dence to the jury, upon a plea of not guilty? In England I suppose it is settled. But it is a
serious Question whether our Constitution is not at present so different as to render the
innovation necessary? Our chief magistrates and Senators are annually eligible by the
people. How are their characters and conduct to be known to their constituents but by the
press? If the press is to be stopped and the people kept in Ignorance we had much better
have the first magistrate and Senators hereditary." Id. at 16.
Both men perceived the fuinidamental necessity for public information in a democratic
or representative system and the crucial role of freedom of the press in assuring the
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The passage of the controversial Alien and Sedition Acts of 17986"
provoked the first comprehensive public discussion of the meaning of the
First Amendment.6" In the ensuing national debate, James Madison, the
drafter of the First Amendment, and others were moved to articulate and
defend their understanding of freedom of speech and press.64 The Virginia
Resolutions of 1798, drafted by Madison and passed by the Virginia General
Assembly, pronounced the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional on the
grounds, inter alia, that the acts exercise "a power which, more than any
other, ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the
right offreely examining public characters and measures, and of free com-
munication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed
the only effectual guardian of every other right." 5
availability of such public information. Cushing expressly recognized the distinction be-
tween acquiring information and disseminating it. He included the former, with no hint of
surprise or disagreement by Adams, within the compass of the state constitutional provi-
sion protecting freedom of the press.
62. The Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798) (extended the period of resi-
dence for naturalization from five to fourteen years); The Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570
(1798) (authorized the President to expel any alien he considered dangerous); The Enemy
Alien Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (permitted the detention of subjects of an enemy
nation); The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (outlawed the publication of false or
malicious writings against the government and the incitement of opposition to any act of
Congress or the President).
63. At the time, the United States was on the verge of war with France. Fear of
French revolutionary ideas and rumors of French plots and espionage were sweeping the
country. The Federalists, then in power and engaged in a bitter controversy with the Re-
publicans, passed the acts, proposed by the more extreme among the party, to curb the
power of the Republican party and the aggressive press, which had been leading the Re-
publican attack. The three alien laws were aimed at French and Irish immigrants, who
were mostly Republicans. Although the Alien Act was never applied, it induced many
aliens to leave the country or go into hiding. The Sedition Act was vigorously enforced,
always against Republicans, but the victims were later pardoned by Jefferson and eventu-
ally Congress repaid most of the fines. The acts profoundly shocked the country and were
a major factor in the Republican victory over the Federalists in 1800. The constitutionality
of the Alien and Sedition Acts, so hotly contested in Congress, never reached the Su-
preme Court; all of the acts either expired or were repealed between 1800 and 1802. The
validity of the Sedition Act, however, was sustained by the lower federal courts and by
three Supreme Court justices sitting on circuit. See 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B.
NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 25-28 (4th ed. 1976).
64. It has been suggested that the "Sedition Act debates are unreliable as evidence-
of the Framers' original understanding of freedom of speech and press." LEVY, supra
note 55, at 249. Recognizing that the debates were intensely political and occurred sub-
sequent to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, they should not, however, be entirely
discounted; the statements were made not long after the ratification of the First Amend-
ment and often by the very individuals who actively participated in the drafting and rat-
ification process.
65. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528-29 (J. Elliot ed. 1901) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
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The congressional debates over the acts produced a series of statements
by leaders of the Jeffersonian party equating freedom of speech and press
with the right of the people to know about the affairs of their government.
John Nicholas of Virginia, arguing against the acts, observed:
It has been the object of all regulations with respect to the press, to
destroy the only means by which the people can examine and become
acquainted with the conduct of persons employed in their Govern-
ment. . . .If this billbe passed into law, the people will be deprived of
that information on public measures, which they have a right to receive,
and which is the life and support of a free Government ... .66
Albert Gallatin opposed the acts, not only as violative of the First Amend-
ment, but as contrary to the nature of representative government and to the
doctrine of popular sovereignty:
If you put the press under any restraint in respect to the measures of
members of Government; if you thus deprive the people of the means of
obtaining information of their conduct, you in fact render their right of
electing nugatory .... 67
[I]n the case of the sedition law, the [First Amendment] prohibitory
clause, respecting an abridgement of the liberty of the press, is attempted
to be construed away [by the law's proponents] by . . . doctrines in-
compatible with the principles of a Government elective in all its Execu-
tive and Legislative branches; of a Government which the people, the
sole fountain of power, cannot properly carry into execution, if the
sources of information are shut up from them; if a free and full discussion
of every public measure is at the will of those who enjoy only a delegated
authority .... *6
Other opponents of the acts expressed similar views.69 Supporters of the acts
did not dispute the democratic principles espoused by the opponents.
cited as ELLIOT]. For further elaborations in Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolu-
tions, see id. at 569, 573-76. Years later, in his usual eloquent style, Madison made what
has become a classic statement of the underlying rationale for the right to know: "A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignor-
ance; And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4,
1822, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
66. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2140 (1798) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as AN-
NALS]. Before the final vote, Nicholas urged his colleagues "to reflect on the nature of
our Government; that all its officers are elective, and that the people have no other means
of examining their conduct but by means of the press, and an unrestrained investigation
through them of the conduct of the Government."
He said "that he never yet saw the time when he would not again have voted for this
Constitution, relying .upon the operations which complete information, with respect to the
transactions of Government, would have upon the minds of the people." Id. at 2144. For
further statements by Nicholas, see id. at 2104, 2142; 9 id. at 3006-07.
67. 8 id. at 2110.
68. 9 id. at 2996. See further statements by Gallatin in id. at 2162, 2164.
69. Edward Livingston said: "The Constitution seems to have contemplated cases
which might arise at a future day. It seems to have forseen that majorities . . . might be
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Rather, they recognized that "[i]n Governments like ours, where all politi-
cal power is derived from the people, and whose foundations are laid in
public opinion, it is essential that the people be truly informed of the pro-
ceedings, the motives, and views of their constituted authorities. '"70 The
emphasis of the proponents of the act, however, was on truly informing the
people, and it was deemed the duty of the constituted authorities "to keep in
a state of purity the channels of public information, and to make liable to
exemplary punishments malicious persons, who, by wantonly disseminating
unfounded suspicions, impose upon the understandings, inflame the pas-
sions, and mislead the judgments of their fellow-citizens." ' "
Although the evidence above suggests a specific intent of some of the
framers to guarantee the right to know, there is insufficient direct evidence
to proclaim confidently that this was the intent behind the First Amendment.
There is, however, substantial evidence of the political and legal thought in
England and America and the thinking of the framers on closely related
subjects that further supports such a conclusion. At the very least, the
fundamental need for public information about governmental affairs was
actuated by dispositions hostile to the Government; that it might wish to pass laws to
suppress the only means by which its corrupt views might be made known to the people,
and therefore says, no law shall be passed to abridge the liber' of speech and of the
press." 8 id. at 2153.
Nathaniel Macon argued that "if elections are to be free, the people ought to have
the liberty of freely investigating the character, conduct, and ability of each candidate to
fill any place of public trust ....
"A considerable argument in favor of the liberty of the press, if there was a neces-
sity for one, might be derived from the old saying, that truth wxill always prevail. This
Mr. M. said he firmly believed, and could not discover any reason for preventing a free
investigation of all public acts ....
". .. [That part [of the Constitution] which declares that the President and other
officers may be impeached .. .also shows the propriety of examining into the conduct
of all officers, because it supposes that some one of them may commit a crime for which
he ought to be impeached and punished." 10 id. at 406. See further statements by Macon
in 10 id. at 964-65.
Mr. Claibourne "remarked that the conduct of our public men should always be in-
vestigated; that free investigation was inseparable from a representative Government, and
essential to its preservation .... ." 10 id. at 929.
Mr. Nitholson also opposed the acts, expressing similar views. 10 id. at 923.
70. 10 id. at 930-31 (Mr. Rutledge).
71. 10 id. at 931 (Mr. Rutledge). Such an argument would generally be rejected
today in recognition of the fact that no one, including the government, has a monopoly on
truth and purity. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). Note however, that if one accepts Mr. Rutledge's unstated premise that it is actu-
ally possible for one person or group of persons (e.g., an administration) to separate truth
from untruth, then his ideas, far from being inconsistent with the right to kndw, appear
designed to promote it by providing the public with more reliable information. For further
remarks by proponents of the acts, see 10 ANNALS, supra note 66. at 924-25 (Mr. Dana);
id. at 961 (Mr. H. Lee).
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widely perceived, and freedom of speech and press were seen as crucial and
instrumental in fulfilling that need; indeed, that was often expressed as the
ultimate function of freedom of speech and press, its raison d'gtre.
b. Evidence of general thinking on a people's right to know
One of the earliest and most famous defenses of freedom of the press is
John Milton's A eropagitica, written in 1644. Recognizing the vital function
performed by the press in disseminating information, Milton appealed to the
British Parliament for an end to licensing of the press: "Give me the liberty
to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all
liberties . . "."72 During the course of the long political struggle in Eng-
land for freedom of the press, including freedom to publish parliamentary
debates, the argument was repeatedly made that the people need to know
and have a right to know about the affairs of government. 3
72. J. MILTON, AEROPAGITIcA-A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UN-
LICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), in PRIMER OF IN-
TELLECTUAL FREEDOM 169 (H. Jones ed. 1949).
73. Matthew Tindal, England's leading Deist at the turn of the eighteenth century,
like most writers of the time, was primarily interested in freedom openly to discuss mat-
ters of religious controversy, but "he also claimed that everyone 'has a natural Right in
all matters of Learning and Knowledge' to discover what can be said by speech or press
on all sides of every subject, including civil and governmental matters .... ." LEVY,
supra note 55, at 108 (quoting M. TINDAL, REASONS AGAINST RESTRAINING THE
PRESS 9-10 (1704)).
At least one newspaper, the Craftsman, recognized its informative function and ex-
pressed a determination to inquire into the whole field of politics. The aim of the
Craftsman "was first, to establish those general priniples of government, upon which the
true interest, happiness and glory of this nation are founded, and upon which only they
can subsist; secondly, to give countrymen, from time to time, a genuine account and in-
formation of all great transactions of state, which might occur, whilst we continue to
write." Craftsman, no. 264, July 24, 1731, in L. HANSON, GOVERNMENT AND THE
PRESS 1695-1763, at 6 (1936) [hereinafter cited as HANSON].
During the struggle over the publication of parliamentary proceedings the London
Magazine maintained: ' Fvery subject not only has the right, but is in duty bound, to
enquire into the publick measures pursued; because by such enquiry he may discover that
some of the publick measures tend towards overturning the liberties of his country; and by
making such a discovery in time, and acting strenuously according to his station, against
them, he may disappoint their effect. This enquiry ought always to be made with great
deference to our superiors in power; Put it ought to be made with freedom and even with
jealousy." HANSON, supra,'at 82 (quoting The London Magazine).
Another writer declared: "It is absolutely necessary towards the well being of a State
that the People should have an Opportunity of being informed of the Behaviour of their
Governours, and of those With whom they intrust their Liberty: It is their undoubted Right
to know the Opinion of wise and honest Men in relation to Publick Matters, and to form
Judgments upon them.
"Since, therefore, any Infringement of the Liberty of the Press can answer no End
but that of depriving the People of the Assistance of all those Men of Capacity and Integ-
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American colonists were well acquainted with the English experience,
and American .political thought was shaped to a considerable extent by
English writers."4 But concern on this side of the Atlantic for openness in
rity, who are able and willing to inform and advise them; since it will make the People
utter Strangers to what they have a Right and Interest to be acquainted with, or what is
worse, liable to have every Thing represented to them in a false Light by those in Power,
who will allow no other Accounts than their own to be transmitted to them, and as this
cannot but be introductory of the most abject Degree of Slavery. I hope every true En-
glishman will so express his Abhorrence of such a Design, as shall entirely discounte-
nance and defeat it." COMMON SENSE: OR, THE ENGLISHMAN'S JOURNAL 335-40
(1738). See also id. at 349-54.
By 1738, "when the House of Commons made its last great effort to prevent the
publication of its transactions, there was a considerable body of opinion within the House
itself which thought the attempt as politically retrograde as it was to prove impossible of
execution. Sir William Wyndham, the leader of the opposition, declared: 'I do not know
but that they [the people] may have a right to know somewhat more of the proceedings of
this House than what appears upon your votes; and if I were sure that the sentiments of
members were not misrepresented, I should be against our coming to any resolution that
could deprive them of a knowledge that is so necessary for their being able to judge of
the merits of their representatives within doors.' " HANSON, supra, at 4 (quoting 10 W.
COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 803 (1812)) (Hanson's quotation of Sir Wyndham
varies from Cobbett's in minor respects).
During the years before the Revolutionary War, English xNriters continued to as-
sociate freedom of press with the need and right of the people to have information about
their government. In 1762, the famous North Briton papers reiterated: "The liberty of the
press is the birth-right of a BRITON, and is justly esteemed the firmest bulwark of the
liberties of this country. It has been the terror of all bad ministers; for their dark and
dangerous designs, or their weakness, inability, and duplicity, have thus been detected
and shewn to the public, generally in too strong and just colours for them to long bear up
against the odium of mankind. Can we then be surprised that so various and infinite arts
have been employed, at one time entirely to set aside, at another to take off the force, and
blunt the edge, of this most sacred weapon, given for the defence of truth and liberty? A
wicked and corrupt administration must naturally dread this appeal to the world; and will
be for keeping all the means of information equally from the prince, parliament, and
people. Every method will then be tried, and all arts put in practice, to check the spirit of
knowledge and enquiry." THE NORTH BRITON No. 1, at 1 (1766) (originally published
June 5, 1762).
In 1766, a writer identifying himself only as "Father of Candor" (but from the
internal evidence, Levy concludes that he was probably an eminent public figure with a
legal background; LEVY supra note 55, at 150) replied to a conservative tract: "The lib-
erty of 'exposing and opposing a bad Administration' . . . was a necessary right of a free
people and the foremost benefit that could be derived from an unrestrained press." LEVY,
supra note 55, at 150-51 (quoting a letter from Father of Candor reprinted in 1 A COL-
LECTION OF INTERESTING POLITICAL TRACTS (J. Almon ed. (probably) 1773)).
74. Perhaps the most influential English writers were the Whig political journalists
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. Under the joint pseudonym "Cato" they wrote a
series of essays published in London newspapers beginning in 1720. "No one," wrote
historian Clinton Rossiter, "can spend any time in the newspapers, library inventories,
and pamphlets of colonial America without realizing that Cato's Letters rather than
Locke's Civil Government was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political
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government can be found as early as 1641 in the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties."5 Section thirty-nine of that document provides:
Every Inhabitant of the Country shall have free libertie to search and
veewe any Rooles, Records, or Regesters of any Court or office except
the Councell, And to have a transcript or exemplification thereof written,
examined, and signed by the hand of the officer of the office paying the
appointed fees therefore."
The famous Zenger case of 1735," in which printer-publisher John Peter
Zenger was tried for seditious libel, prompted the first major American
contributions to libertarian theory of freedom of speech and of the press.
Andrew Hamilton, Zenger's eloquent defense attorney, successfully argued
to the jury, despite common law doctrine to the contrary, that truth cannot be
a libel. In his closing statements, which were subsequently published and
widely read,"8 Hamilton appealed to the jury to see the question not as "the
Cause of a poor Printer," but as "the Cause of Liberty," concluding that
"by an impartial and uncorrupt Verdict" the jury would earn the honor of
"every Man who prefers Freedom to a Life of Slavery" for having "laid a
noble Foundation for securing to ourselves, our Posterity, and our
Neighbours, That, to which Nature and the Laws of our Country have
given us a Right-The Liberty-both of exposing and opposing arbitrary
ideas in the colonial period." RoSSITER, supra note 7, at 141. The most famous of
Cato's Letters was Of Freedom of Speech: That the same is inseparable from Public Lib-
erty, quoted above by Benjamin Franklin. See note 58 supra.
In another letter entitled The Right and Capacity of the People to judge of Govern-
inent, Cato observed that "some have said, It is not the Business of private Men to med-
dle with Government. A bold, false, and dishonest Saying; and whoever says it, either
knows not what he says, or cares not, or slavishly speaks the Sense of others. It is a Cant
now almost forgot in England, and which never prevailed but when Liberty and the Con-
stitution were attacked ....
"But to the Falsehood of the Thing: Publick Truths ought never to be kept Secrets;
and they who do it, are guilty of a Solaecism, and a Contradiction: Every Man ought to
know what it concerns All to know. Now, nothing upon Earth is of a more universal
Nature than Government; and every private Man upon Earth has a Concern in it, because
in it is concerned, and nearly and immediately concerned, his Virtue, his Property, and
the Security of his Person . . . ." Cato, The Right and Capacity of the People to judge
of Government (1721), in ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE, supra note 58, at 96-97.
The popular letter Reflections upon Libelling is discussed in note 80 infra.
75. The Body of Liberties is an early code of laws that laid the foundation of Mas-
sachusetts government and law. See I THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS
1641-1691, at xiii-xxv (J. Cushing ed. 1976).
76. 3 id. at 696.
77. The Trial of Mr. John Peter Zenger, 17 How. ST. TR. 675 (1735).
78. "A brief Narrative of the Case and Tryal of John Peter Zenger, published by
Zenger in 1736, was, with the possible exception of Cato's Letters, the most widely
known source of libertarian thought in England and America during the eighteenth cen-
tury." LEVY, supra note 55, at 133.
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Power (in these Parts of the World, at least) by speaking and writing
Truth.''
7 9
In the ensuing years before the Constitutional Convention, American
writers often associated a right to know with freedom of speech and of the
press."0 For example, in 1766 William Bollan of Massachusetts wrote:
After giving this matter the best consideration in my power, it appears to
me that the free examination of public measures, with a proper repre-
sentation by speech or writing of the sense resulting from that examina-
79. A brief Narrative of the Case and Tryal of John Peter Zenger, in FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, supra note 61, at 59.
80. In an excellent but apparently little-known essay, James Alexander, Zenger's
original attorney and mastermind of Zenger's defense, declared that "THE FREEDOM OF
SPEECH is a principal pillar in a free Government: when this support is taken away the
Constitution is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins. Republics and limited
monarchies derive their strength and vigor from a popular examination into the actions of
the Magistrates." The Pennsylvania Gazette, Nov. 17, 1737, quoted in FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, supra note 61, at 62 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 66-67.
Andrew Bradford, publisher of The American Weekly Merci-', has generally been
overlooked as a libertarian thinker "because he was on the 'wrong" side of [the] popular
[Zenger] cause and he was the joumalistic opponent of the revered Franklin." Id. at 38.
But even before the Zenger controversy stirred others to put pen to paper, Bradford had
declared that "by the Freedom of the Press, I mean a Liberty, within the Bounds of Law,
for any Man to communicate to the Public, his Sentiments on the Important Points of
Religion and Government; of proposing any Laws, which he apprehends may be for the
Good of his Countrey, and of applying for the Repeal of such, as he Judges pernicious. I
mean a Liberty of detecting the wicked and destructive Measures of certain Politicians; of
dragging Villany out of it's [sic] obscure lurking Holes, and exposing it in it's [sic] full
Deformity to open Day; of attacking Wickedness in high Places, of disintangling the intri-
cate Folds of a wicked and corrupt Administration, and pleading freely for a Redress of
Grievances .... ." The American Weekly Mercury, Apr. 25, 1734, quoted in FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 61, at 41-42 (emphasis in original).
In 1747, the New York governor and the General Assembly became embroiled in a
dispute over the appropriation of defense funds. When the governor attempted to prevent
the publication of a remonstrance drawn up by the legislators, they voted unanimously:
"That it is the undoubted Right of the People of this Colony, to know the Proceedings of
their Representatives . . .That any Attempt to prohibit the printing or re-printing, any of
the Proceedings of this House, is an infringement of the Privileges of this House, and of
the People they represent .... ." 2 JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NEW
YORK 193, quoted in LEVY, supra note 55, at 45. But see Levy's critical interpretation,
id. at 45-49.
Richard Bland, an influential member of the Virginia House of Burgesses and later a
delegate to the first Constitutional Convention, wrote to George Washington in 1756 about
a public controversy over alleged mismanagement in the military. Of freedom of speech
and press he wrote: "If what I may say should give Offence to any, for I give you free
Liberty to communicate it, tell them, that I have the Honour to be a British Subject, and,
under that glorious Character, enjoy the Privileges of an Englishman, one of which is to
examine with Freedom, our public Measures, without being liable to the Punishments of
French Tyranny; and, if I think proper, to expose those public Errors which have had
to[o] long a Course, and which have been blindly embraced by many, as the most true
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tion, is the right of the members of a free state, and requisite for the
preservation of their other rights; and that all things published by persons
for the sake of giving due information to their fellow subjects, in points
mediately or immediately affecting the public welfare, are worthy of
commendation.81
Concern for the right to know about public affairs is evidenced in the early
state constitutions and conventions as well.82 The Pennsylvania Constitution
Opinions." 22 PA. MAGAZINE OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 445 (1898), in ROSSITER,
supra note 7, at 275.
81. W. BOLLAN, THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND WRITING UPON PUBLIC AF-
FAIRS, CONSIDERED, W rITH AN HISTORICAL VIEw 4 (1766) (emphasis added), re-
printed in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 61, at 85. See also A. SCHLESINGER,
PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE 140 (1958).
82. The people of Massachusetts rejected a constitution proposed in 1778 largely
due to its omission of a bill of rights. Most states had followed Virginia's lead in protect-
ing freedom of the press by a constitutional guarantee, and "the omission of such a provi-
sion in Massachusetts ran counter to the current of the political thought of the day. The
return of the Lenox town-meeting contained the following clause, which was perhaps a
typical endorsement of a carefully limited freedom of the press," and, it may be added, is
indicative of thought at that time equating freedom of press with the right to know about
governmental affairs: "We further suppose that by a Constitution the printing presses
ought to be declared free for any Person who might undertake to examine the proceedings
of the Legislature or any part of Government." C. DUNIWAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS 132-33 (1906) (quoting the Lenox return
in 156 MASS. ARCHIVES 381). See also id. at 134-38.
The 1792 Constitution of Delaware, although ratified after the First Amendment, may
nevertheless be indicative of contemporary thinking. Section 5 of Article I states: "The
press shall be free to every citizen who undertakes to examine the official conduct of men
acting in a public capacity; and any citizen may print on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty." Here, again, preserving freedom of the press is seen as a
means of preserving the even more fundamental right of the people to know what their
agents are doing. The section goes on to adopt Hamilton's position in the Zenger case
(see notes 77-79 and accompanying text supra): "In prosecutions for publications inves-
tigating the proceedings of officers, or where the matter published is proper for public
information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels,
the jury may determine the facts and the law, as in other cases." I THORPE, supra note
60, at 569. The second part of section 5, drawing a distinction between proper and im-
proper matter for public information, seems to follow the thinking of Cato in Reflections
upon Libelling, where it was noted that some truths-relating to personal and private
matters-are not fit to be told. But "it is quite otherwise when the Crimes of Men come
to affect the Publick. . . .Every Crime against the Publick is a great Crime . ...
"The exposing therefore of publick Wickedness, as it is a Duty which every Man
owes to Truth and his Country, can never be a Libel in the Nature of Things .....
Cato, Reflections upon Libelling (1721), in ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE, supra
note 58, at 73-74.
The public-private, proper-improper dichotomy was common in discussions of the
subject of libel. In 1789 Benjamin Franklin remarked that if freedom of the press meant
the liberty of affronting and defaming one another, he favored limiting it by a civil libel
statute, but if it meant "the Liberty of discussing the Propriety of Public Measures and
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of 1776 declared: "The printing presses shall be free to every person who
undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any part of
government." 3 In 1788 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was called upon
to determine the meaning of this clause, together with the provision that
"the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained." 84 Chief Justice
McKean replied:
However ingenuity may torture the expressions, there can be little doubt
of the just sense of these sections; they give to every citizen a right of
investigating the conduct of those who are intrusted with the public
business; and they effectually preclude any attempt to fetter the press by
the institution of a licenser.85
Thus by the time the First Amendment was drafted, one state, Pennsylvania,
had already expressly interpreted its free press clauses to guarantee to the
people a right to acquire as well as to disseminate information concerning
government business."
The attitude of the framers toward the people's right to know is perhaps
most clearly indicated not by their discussions of freedom of speech and of
the press, but by their discussions of the provisions relating to the treaty
power," to publication of the journal of each house of Congress, 8 and to
publication of the accounts of public monies.8 9 The overwhelming consen-
political opinions, let us have as much of it as you please . ... B. Franklin, An Ac-
count of the Supremest Court of Judicature of the State of Pennsylvania, viz. The Court of
the Press, The Federal Gazette, Sept. 12, 1789, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 38 (A. Smyth ed. 1907). Such remarks and the entire public-private, proper-
improper dichotomy are important for their reflection on the thinking of the time; greater
importance and greater freedom were accorded to activities designed to investigate gov-
ernment and to inform the people about public affairs.
83. PA. CONST. of 1776, Frame of Government, § 35, in 5 THORPE, supra note
60, at 3090.
84. PA. CoNsT. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 12, in 5 THORPE, supra note
60, at 3083.
85. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) *319, *325 (1788) (emphasis added).
On the question of the Constitution's effect on the law of libel, Chief Justice McKean
maintained that freedom of the press in Pennsylvania meant just what it had meant in
,England-the absence of prior restraints. Id. at *325.
86. In apparent recognition of this judicial gloss, the 1790 Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion substantially repeated the provision guaranteeing access to presses to anyone examin-
ing government proceedings, adding that "no law shall ever be made to restrain the right
thereof." PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7, in 5 THORPE, supra note 60, at 3100.
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: The President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur. .. "
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, c. 3: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Pro-
ceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy . .. ."
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 7: A "regular Statement and Account of the Re-
ceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."
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sus expressed in the federal convention and in state conventions was that
secrecy should be tolerated only in cases of necessity, such as during war
and treaty negotiations."
Patrick Henry expressed the sentiments of those who feared that the
Constitution provided inadequate protection against secrecy:
The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the
transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them. . . .I am not
an advocate for divulging indiscriminately all the operations of govern-
ment, though the practice of our ancestors, in some degree, justifies it.
Such transactions as relate to military operations or affairs of great con-
sequence, the immediate promulgation of which might defeat the inter-
ests of the community, I would not wish to be published, till the end
which required their secrecy should have been effected. But to cover
with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an abomina-
tion in the eyes of every intelligent man, and every friend to his coun-
try.
91
John Marshall speaking for proponents of the Constitution, answered Hen-
ry's fears and objections:
Is there no secrecy [in the British government]? When deliberating on the
propriety of declaring war, or on military arrangements, do they deliber-
ate in the open fields? No, sir. The British government affords secrecy
when necessary, and so ought every government. In this plan [the Con-
stitution], secrecy is only used when it would be fatal and pernicious to
publish the schemes of government.9"
The exchange between Henry and Marshall is typical of other debates on
government secrecy in that fears of secrecy were usually answered with
assurances that the Constitution authorized secrecy only when absolutely
necessary.
9 3
Generally the discussions of secrecy focused on the powers conferred
on the national government by various provisions and potential abuses of
those powers rather than on the role of the people in checking government
90. See the statements of Mr. Widgery, Mr. Gorham, and Rev. Mr. Perly in 2 EL-
LIOT, supra note 65, at 52; Gov. Randolph in 3 id. at 201-02, 401; Mr. Mason in 5 id.
at 408; Mr. Davie in 4 id. at 72-73; Mr. Iredell in 4 id. at 73; Mr. Charles C. Pinckney
in 4 id. at 264-65; Mr. Franklin in 5 id. at 284; and Mr. Sherman in 5 id. at 523. See
notes 91, 93, 96 infra.
91. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 170. For further statements by Henry, see id. at
315-16, 398, 462.
92. Id. at 233.
93. During the Virginia convention, in response to a suggestion by George Mason
to specify the circumstances warranting secrecy as the Confederation had done (id. at
404), James Madison remarked: "With respect to secrecy, if every thing in which it is
necessary could be enumerated, I would have no objection to mention them. All the state
legislatures can keep secret what they think ought to be concealed. The British House of
Commons can do it. They are in this respect under much less restraint than Congress.
There never was any legislative assembly without a discretionary power of concealing im-
portant transactions, the publication of which might be detrimental to the community.
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secrecy. But in an interesting discussion in the federal convention of the
provision requiring each house of Congress to publish its journal from time
to time, "excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy,'"'"
two major figures in the Convention disclosed their understanding of the
people's power and right in this regard. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut
observed: "As the clause is objectionable in so many shapes, it may as well
be struck out altogether. The legislature will not fail to publish their proceed-
ings from time to time. The people will call for it, if it should be improperly
omitted." 95 What is striking about Ellsworth's remarks is the ease with
which he presumes the people have it within their power and ability to
monitor and check government secrecy even without an express constitu-
tional provision. James Wilson of Pennsylvania shared Ellsworth's high
regard for the people but not Ellsworth's cool confidence in the people's
ability to check secrecy without the aid of a constitutional provision: "Mr.
WILSON thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper. The
people have a right to know what their agents are doing or have done, and it
should not be in the option of the legislature to conceal their proceedings." 96
Here, in the most explicit language, one of the most influential members of
There can be no real danger as long as the government is constructed on such principles."
Id. at 409 (emphasis added). See notes 90-92 supra and note 96 infra.
Madison's defense of secrecy and the sentiments expressed by other framers in this
regard are remarkably consistent with the thesis (developed in notes 156-226 and accom-
panying text infra) that the people have a right to know all information that it is not
necessary to withhold in order to further a compelling state interest. Foreign negotiations
and military operations, the two most commonly voiced justifications for secrecy in the
various constitutional conventions, represent two of the most widely acknowledged illust-
rations of a situation likely to involve a compelling interest in secrecy.
During the debate in the Virginia convention over the provision directing publication
from time to time of the accounts of public monies, George Mason again sought to
specify the circumstances warranting secrecy and to assure that the people would be in-
formed of everything else. His analysis, although expressed in terms of the immediate
issues at hand, is in practical terms identical to the above thesis: "Mr. GEORGE
MASON apprehended the loose expression of 'publication from time to time' was applic-
able to any time. It was equally 'applicable to monthly and septenial periods. . . . The
reason urged in favor of this ambiguous expression was, that there might be some matters
which require secrecy. In matters relative to military operations and foreign negotiations,
secrecy was necessary sometimes; but he did not conceive that the receipts and expendi-
tures of the public money ought ever to be concealed. The people, he affirmed, had a
right to know the expenditures of their money; but that this expression was so loose, it
might be concealed forever from them .... ."Id. at 459.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
95. 5 Elliot, supra note 65, at 408.
96. Id. (emphasis added). Others, such as Patrick Henry, saw too little protection
against secrecy in this clause because it failed to specify how often the journals were to
be published or under what circumstances parts of the journal could be kept secret. Vil-
son, however, evidently focusing on the provision's affirmative command to publish the
journals, saw it as primarily supportive of the people's right to know; hence his objection
to expunging the clause. The Convention voted to retain the clause. Id. at 409.
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the Constitutional Convention of 1787 declared before that Convention that
the people have a right to know.97
The evidence suggests that most of the participants in the process that
produced the Constitution and the Bill of Rights recognized the fundamental
need of the people to be informed about their government's transactions.
Although some evidence points to a specific intent to embody a directly
enforceable right to know within the protective coverage of the First
Amendment, the question remains debatable. It would be understandable if
the framers focused their concern on the dissemination of information
among the people, rather than on the initial problem of obtaining the infor-
mation. The new nation was large and communication and travel were
difficult and uncertain, whereas the government was small and relatively
easy to watch and monitor for one who was interested.98 Moreover, it would
be natural for attention to be drawn by the English and colonial struggle for a
free press to the problems of licensing, taxation, and direct censorship.99
What emerges clearly from the evidence, however, is that while concern
often centered on the freedom to disseminate information, there was an
acute awareness that the underlying and ultimate purpose of this freedom
was to provide the people with the information they needed and had a right
to acquire. Freedom of speech and of the press in this sense were seen as
instrumental in effectuating the more fundamental right to know.
97. Of course, while Wilson's statement is couched in terms applicable to the gen-
eral relationship between the people and the government, he was at the time confronted
only with a specific provision applicable to the legislature. It should be noted, however,
that at the time of the Convention, the national legislature was generally expected to be
the most powerful and active branch of government.
During the Pennsylvania convention, Wilson had occasion to speak of secrecy in a
different context, involving the executive branch. His comments indicate the narrow
confines within which he would sanction government secrecy. While discussing the alloca-
tion of the treaty power between the President and the Senate, he observed: "Treaties are
frequently (especially in time of war) of such a nature, that it would be extremely impro-
per to publish them, or even commit the secret of their negotiation to any great number of
persons. For my part, I am not an advocate for secrecy in transactions relating to the
public; not generally even in forming treaties, because I think that the history of the dip-
lomatic corps will evince, even in that great department of politics, the truth of the old
adage, that 'honesty is the best policy,' and this is the conduct of the most able
negotiators; yet sometimes secrecy may be necessary, and therefore it becomes an argu-
ment against committing the knowledge of these transactions to too many persons." 2 id.
at 506. For further statements by. Wilson, see 5 id. at 284, 523.
98. Parks, supra note 14, at 10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 633-34 (J.
Hamilton ed. 1904) (A. Hamilton). See also Access to Official Information, supra note
29, at 219.
99. Parks, supra note 14, at 10. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936). The lack of an express statement regarding the right to know also can be
explained by the fact that, "like many other fundamental rights, it was taken so much for
granted that it was deemed unnecessary to include it." Hennings, supra note 29, at 668.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton); 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1857-68 (1891).
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In the early days of the republic, guaranteeing the freedom to dissemi-
nate information may have adequately effectuated the right to know.' 0 But
today the growth of government and governmental secrecy has greatly com-
plicated the preliminary problem of gathering and acquiring information
while modem transportation and communication have rendered dissemina-
tion practically effortless. The Constitution is and was intended to be a
dynamic instrument to be interpreted in light of present conditions.' If,
indeed, the framers, in an effort to effectuate the right to know, concentrated
their efforts on the freedom to disseminate, it does not follow that, con-
fronted with today's problems, adequate constitutional protection for the
right to know is unavailable. Having recognized the importance of the right
to know and being fully aware of the flexible nature of the Constitution,
surely one should not attribute to the framers an intention to deny effective
implementation of the right today. On the contrary, it would do justice to the
evident sentiments of the framers to recognize and effectuate a directly
enforceable right to know.
2. Functional Interpretation
If the historical evidence of the intent of the framers is deemed in-
adequate to resolve doubts, one can resort, as the Supreme Court often does,
to a functional analysis. °2 The purpose of a provision is usually determined,
under this method of interpretation, by looking to the language in question
together with generally understood principles regarding the structure and
values of society, rather than to the specific intentions of those who origi-
nally adopted the provision. 1°3 Once the purpose is defined, the provision
100. "To the originators of our Constitution, who contemplated an administrative
hierarchy no larger than a medium-sized corporation of today, it may have appeared
sufficient to entrust this fundamental right to the ability of the press to ferret out the facts
and convey them to the public." Access to Official Information, supra note 29, at 219;
Parks, supra note 14, at 10.
101. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage & Hour Div.,
312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819). See also Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is An Absoltte, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 263-66.
"No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the
people of the United States much greater freedom .. .than the people of Great Britain
had ever enjoyed ....
"[T]he unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give to
liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could be counte-
nanced in an orderly society." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
"[Tihe First Amendment .. .must be taken as a command of the broadest scope
that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow." Id. at
263. See Parks, supra note 14, at 11.
102. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40-41 (1971);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84-85 n. 10 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269-77 (1964).
103. Purpose is thus a broader, more inclusive concept than the more specific intent
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should be interpreted whenever possible to further that purpose.1"4
The widely acknowledged purpose of the freedom of speech and of the
press clauses are "to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."1
05
Obviously, the people cannot discuss governmental affairs of which they are
totally unaware. Even when the people have some, perhaps substantial,
knowledge of a particular matter, discussion cannot be full, and certainly not
free, if the people are denied selected information of special importance and
relevance. 106 The power to withhold information holds the potential for
manipulation of public opinion and provides the government with the means
to reduce its accountability to the people. When information concerning
governmental affairs is concealed, public discussion may be nipped in the
bud; public attention may be diverted to other matters; and the will of the
people may never reach fruition.'0" Freedom of discussion is illusory unless
preliminarily there is an effective means of acquiring accurate and adequate
knowledge upon which to make reasoned and informed judgments. If the
First Amendment is to function properly, if it is to fulfill its purpose, the
right of the people to know what their government is doing must be recog-
nized as a necessary element of freedom of speech and press.'0 8
MI. Government Recognition of the Right to Know
All three branches of the federal government have acknowledged that
the people have an undoubted right to know some things about their gov-
ernment. The full extent of this right remains unarticulated, however, and it
is apparent that the different branches do not always operate under the same
conception of the nature and scope of the right.
of the framers. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING-
CASES AND MATERIALS 41-43 (1975).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
105. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Even broader purposes have
been suggested: "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail" (Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); and
"to guarantee the maintenance of an effective system of free expression" (EMERSON,
supra note 14, at viii, 48). The same result would ultimately flow from these broader
statements of purpose. See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976
WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2, 4 (right to know serves individual interests such as personal fulfill-
ment as well as the societal interests underlying the First Amendment).
106. "It can plausibly be said that, since no act is free unless it is adequately
equipped, no regular function of expression is free unless it is supplied from whatever
source with the stuff which is to be expressed." W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS 159 (1947). See statement of A. Meiklejohn, note 29 supra.
107. See F. ROURKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY: DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY
101-102 (1961) [hereinafter cited as ROURKE].
108. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). For a functional analysis of the First Amendment in a case
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A. Judiciary
Noting the fundamental link between public knowledge of governmen-
tal affairs and a viable democracy, the Supreme Court has recognized pro-
tection of the free flow of information as a basic objective of the First
Amendment.1"9 Maintaining the flow of information requires protection for
both acquisition and dissemination of information because if either process
is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.1"' The Court's development of
First Amendment doctrine so far has focused primarily on dissemination."'
Recognizing, however, that the paramount interest is that of society in
"an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail," rather than that of the individual in self-expression," 2 the Court has
extended First Amendment protection to receivers as well as disseminators
of information. In a case involving a restriction on the flow of communica-
tion by mail, Justice Brennan wrote: "The dissemination of ideas can ac-
complish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and
consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers.""' The right to receive has been held applicable to
involving the right of the press to gather news, see Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. "The constitutional guarantee of a free press 'assures the maintenance of our
political system and an open society' . . . and secures 'the paramount public interest in a
free flow of information to the people concerning public officials.' " Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (citations omitted). See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 862-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
713-15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640-41
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-43
(1971); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-70 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1944); Thomhill v. Louisiana, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 100-02 (1940); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
110. "Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it, and
circulate it. When anyone of these integral operations is interdicted, freedom of the press
becomes a river without water." In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 681
(1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957). See Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), id. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (symbolic conduct);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right
to distribute); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (right to publish without prior
restraint).
112. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
113. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., con-
curring). The Lamont case involved a statute conditioning delivery of mail from abroad
containing communist propaganda upon a written request of the recipient. The Court held
that the statute violated the addressee's right of free speech.
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personal correspondence, 14 political1 5 and religious material," 6 pomog-
raphy,111 commercial information,' 8 and information, ideas, and experi-
ences of all sorts.119 None of these cases has involved government-held
information; rather, at issue was government interference with the flow of
information from private willing sources to willing receivers. Recognition of
the right to receive is, nevertheless, a significant step toward a comprehen-
sive right to know; it is grounded on the same fundamental bases as the right
to know, and it establishes that First Amendment coverage extends to both
ends of the flow of information.
Receipt of information, however, is passive. 2 ' If the right to know
consisted only of a right to receive, the flow of information would be totally
dependent upon the willingness of the source to communicate. Because
much of the information necessary for informed public evaluation of gov-
ernment activity is in the hands of the government, the potential for control
and manipulation of public knowledge and opinion is obvious. 2' Self-
government under such circumstances would be little more than an illusion.
In order to preserve the free flow of information essential to a democratic
114. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
115. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
116. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943).
117. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene materials
in one's home).
118. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
119. Id.; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (describing the right to receive as within the penumbra of freedom of speech and
press).
The Supreme Court has, however, occasionally ignored or failed to give weight to
the right to receive. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court acknowl-
edged that the First Amendment right to receive was involved in the government's exclu-
sion of an alien from this country, where he was scheduled to speak. The Court held,
however, that the political branches possess inherent and plenary power to exclude aliens
and that when this power is exercised "on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide
reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by
balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek per-
sonal communication with the applicant." Id. at 770. The Court's underlying concern was
that the federal courts would be drawn into reviewing all exclusions of aliens. See also
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (discussed in text accompanying notes 122-26 infra).
120. As conceived by the Court in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the
right to receive apparently does not extend to a right actively to acquire information from
the source: "[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . protect the right of the public
to receive such information and ideas as are published." Id. at 832 (emphasis added).
121. Note, The Public's Right of Access to Government Information Under the
First Amendment, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 164, 177-78 (1974). See Note, The Rights of
the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1510-11
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Rights of the Public and Press].
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system, the right to know must encompass not only a right to receive, but
also a right actively to acquire government information. While the Court has
never expressed a definitive opinion on the constitutional right to acquire
information from an unwilling government source, in a series of recent cases
it has recognized a right involving an active quality not found in the right to
receive-the right of the press to seek out and to gather information from
willing or neutral sources.
InZemel v. Rusk,1 2 the Court's first encounter with an asserted right to
gather information, the claim was given a cool reception. In that case, a
United States citizen contended that the State Department's denial of his
request to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba interfered with his
First Amendment right "to travel abroad so that [he] might acquaint [him-
self] at first hand with the effects abroad of our Government's policies,
foreign and domestic, and with conditions abroad which might affect such
policies. "13 The plaintiff, in effect, asserted a right to gather information
from a neutral source, a place. The Court held that no First Amendment
right was involved, reasoning that the refusal to validate passports for Cuba,
although inhibiting the flow of information, was a prohibition directed at
action.124 The Court went on to assert that "[t]he right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information,''125 im-
plying that perhaps a restrained right might be included within First
Amendment coverage.12 6
In Branzburg v. Hayes17 the Court was confronted with an assertion by
the press of a constitutional privilege not to reveal confidential sources and
information before a grand jury. The reporters argued that to force them to
reveal such confidences would dry up many important sources of news, to
122. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
123. Id. at 16.
124. Id. at 16-17. In other contexts, the Court has afforded First Amendment pro-
tection to conduct. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (protecting
right to picket); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (test for protecting con-
duct involving speech and nonspeech elements); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938) (protecting right to distribute pamphlets). See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 857-59 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing the speech-conduct
dichotomy in Zemel). The Court's cursory treatment of the First Amendment claim in
Zemel may have been the result of judicial reluctance to interfere with congressional and
executive control over foreign affairs. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764
(1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Rights of the Public and Press, supra
note 121, at 1520. See also note 254 infra. The Court's later discussions of Zemel and
treatment of similar claims suggest a greater willingness to consider the First Amendment
interests involved. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1972); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972).
125. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
126. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 n.4 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissent-
127. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First Amend-
ment.128 While acknowledging that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections," '129 for "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated," 3 ' the Court held that
the First Amendment accorded newsmen no testimonial privilege. The Court
analyzed the asserted privilege by balancing the interests involved, but
found "no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and
in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings [was] insufficient to override
the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to
result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant"
grand jury questions. 3 ' The Court's approach leaves open the possibility of
development of a right to gather information in other contexts involving
different aspects of news gathering or different state interests.
The most recent case squarely presenting the issue of a right to gather
information is Pell v. Procunier."3' State prison inmates and journalists
challenged the constitutionality of a state regulation that prohibited face-to-
face interviews between news media representatives and individual willing
inmates selected by the reporters. The media plaintiffs contended that the
state's interference with their access to sources of newsworthy information,
unless justified by a substantial government interest, violated their First
Amendment right to gather news. Reiterating that "news gathering is not
without its First Amendment protections," '133 the Court nevertheless con-
cluded that because the state regulation did not deny the press access to
sources of information available to members of the general public, it did not
abridge the protections that the First Amendment guarantees.1 34 While the
Court did discuss the special circumstances and interests presented by the
state's corrections system, it did not reach its result by balancing the inter-
ests of the various parties. Rather, by simply equating the right of the press
to gather information with that of the public, the Court seems to have
defined one unknown in terms of another and avoided determining the
parameters of either.'3 5 The Court was careful to point out, however, that
the state's corrections policy did allow substantial access to the prisons by
the press and the public, and that the regulation in question was not designed
to conceal from the public conditions prevailing in the prisons.' 36 The appa-
128. Id. at 679-80.
129. Id. at 707.
130. Id. at 681.
131. Id. at 690-91.
132. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
133. Id. at 833.
134. Id. at 835.
135. See Rights of the Public and Press, supra note 121, at 1506-07. See generally
Note, The Public's Right to Know: Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 829 (1975).
136. 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974). The Court made similar observations in the com-
panion case to Pell, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 846-48 (1974).
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rent implication was that for the state completely to cut off access to infor-
mation within its control would impinge on First Amendment rights.
13 7
Despite recognition that information gathering is not without constitu-
tional protection, the majority opinions in Zemel, Branzburg, and Pell, in
both language and result, have not displayed great enthusiasm for the
right. 138 But mere acknowledgment that "a right to gather news, of some
dimensions, must exist, ' 139 is important for establishing that First Amend-
ment protection extends not only to passive receipt of information from
willing sources, but also to information gathering activities initiated by the
recipient and thus not totally dependent on the willingness of the source to
communicate. A willing source is therefore not necessarily a precondition
for First Amendment inquiry.14 While the interests affected by acquisition
of information from an unwilling source will differ from those affected when
the source is neutral or willing, the extension of First Amendment coverage
to recipient-initiated activities opens the door to the consideration of such
interests to determine whether the right to know should indeed apply in
various situations where the source is unwilling. Development of a right
actively to acquire government information thus remains a distinct possibil-
ity.
In contrast to the cautious approach of the majority, most of the dissen-
ters in Zemel, Branzburg, and Pell either wholeheartedly endorsed the
people's right to know or argued for broader application of the right to
gather information. In Zemel, Justices Douglas and Goldberg, characteriz-
ing the right to know as one of the peripheral rights of citizens under the
137. See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q.
1, 15.
138. The decisions have consistently avoided expanding the right or explaining its
nature and scope; the later opinions have simply quoted the language of the earlier opin-
ions with little or no elaboration. The language, such as that quoted in the text, is
couched largely in negative terms, and all of the decisions resulted in denials of the con-
tentions based on the right to gather information. It should be noted, however, that the
result in all of these cases is not necessarily inconsistent with the right to know as posited
in section IV of this note; all of the results arguably can be rationalized on the basis of
necessity to further a compelling state interest.
139. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
140. But see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), where the Court asserted: "Freedom of speech presup-
poses a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists . . . the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both." Id. at 1823. The Court in this
case was confronted with a contention based on the right to receive. The quoted statement
merely reiterates that a willing source is an integral element of the right to receive, and as
indicated by the Court, the statement is derived from previous right to receive decisions.
Id. The right to gather information was not involved in the case- nor were the right to
gather information decisions considered or discussed by the Court. The language quoted
above is, however, susceptible of a broader interpretation than its context warrants-that
is, preconditioning all First Amendment inquiry on the presence of a willing source.
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First Amendment giving meaning and substance to freedom of expression
and freedom of the press,' argued that restrictions on the right to travel in
times of peace should be so particularized that such First Amendment rights
are not impaired unless some clear, countervailing national interest stands in
the way of their assertion.' 42
Elaborating on his conception of the right to know in Branzburg, Jus-
tice Douglas embraced the view of Alexander Meiklejohn that the self-
governing people possess broad rights and powers over their servants in
government.' 43 Based on the vital role of the press in maintaining the flow of
information to the people, Justice Douglas would have accorded reporters an
absolute right not to appear before a grand jury.' As he explained it:
The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to
enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but
to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know. The right to know is
crucial to the governing powers of the people, to paraphrase Alexander
Miklejohn. Knowledge is essential to informed decisions.
. . .The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of
government and inform the people.
45
In Pell, in which the majority had only implied that complete conceal-
ment by the state of information within its control would run afoul of the
First Amendment, the dissenters made the point explicit. Justices Brennan
and Marshall endorsed Justice Douglas' Branzburg statement 46 and joined
in the conclusion that the state's prohibition of press interviews with specific
141. 381 U.S. at 24 (Douglas, J., joined by Goldberg, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 26.
143. 408 U.S. at 713-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 712.
145. Id. at 721. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall would have accorded re-
porters a qualified right not to appear before a grand jury and reveal confidences. They
grounded this right in "the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to
the public. It is this basic concern that underlies the Constitution's protection of a free
press .. .because the guarantee is 'not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us.' .. .
"Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open
society is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable to a free society. ...
"No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of informa-
tion. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire
information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a
right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist. . ..
"The right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a confidential relationship be-
tween a reporter and his source." Id. at 725-28 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan and Mar-
shall, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
146. 417 U.S. at 840 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing) (quoting the first paragraph of the statement in the text accompanying note 145
supra).
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prison inmates "is an unconstitutional infringement of the public's right to
know protected by the free press guarantee of the First Amendment." '147
Not all of the Supreme Court's pronouncements relating to the right to
know have occurred in the context of the recent development of the rights to
receive and to gather information. Grosjean v. American Press Co. 4 stands
out as one of the Court's most comprehensive interpretations of the First
Amendment. Several newspapers sought to enjoin the enforcement of a state
statute imposing a license tax on their revenues. At issue was the scope of
the protection afforded by the First Amendment, a question the Court re-
garded as "of the utmost gravity and importance; for. . it goes.to the heart
of the natural right of the members of an organized society, united for their
common good, to impart and acquire information about their common inter-
ests."I 49 The Court discussed the history of the First Amendment in detail
and noted that opposition to the newspaper licensing and tax acts in England
and the colonies arose as a result of the dominant purpose of the acts, "to
prevent, or curtail the opportunity for, the acquisition of knowledge by the
people in respect of their governmental affairs.'"' ° The Court observed
further:
The aim of the struggle was not to relieve taxpayers from a burden, but to
establish and preserve the right of the English people to full information
in respect of the doings or misdoings of their government. . . . In the
147. Id. at 841. In the companion case to Pell, Justice Powell, joined in his dissent
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, and also enlisting the aid of Alexander Meiklejohn,
argued that the First Amendment "embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-
determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national
policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues. And public debate must not only
be unfettered; -it must also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated
that First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well as
the right of free expression. . . . Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63
(1974).
Noting that this reasoning underlies the Court's recognition that news gathering is not
without its First Amendment protections, Powell continued: "An informed public depends
on accurate and effective reporting by the news media. No individual can obtain for him-
self the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities.
". .. The Bureau's absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews negates the
ability of the press to discharge that function and thereby substantially impairs the right of
the people to a free flow of information and ideas on the conduct of their Government.
The underlying right is the right of the public generally." Id. at 863-64 (Powell, J.,
joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). See also Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 771 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606, 661 (1972) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83 n.8 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965).
148. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
149. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 247. For criticism of the Court's use of history in this case, see Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 121-29 (1943); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE USES OF HISTORY 78-80 (1969).
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ultimate, an informed and enlightened public opinion was the thing at
stake .... 151
In light of the familiarity of the framers with the English and colonial
experience, the Court was compelled to conclude that they intended the First
Amendment "to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public
information. . . .[A]nd since informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the
publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with
grave concern." 152 The focus in Grosjean was on the press, but the Court's
analysis of First Amendment principles, emphasizing that the raison d'9tre
of a free press is to inform the people about their government, is an entirely
adequate basis upon which to predicate and develop the direct right of the
people to know what their government is doing.' 5 3
The Supreme Court has long recognized many of the underlying foun-
dations of the right to know and has, on the basis of these foundations,
extended constitutional protection to the rights to receive and to gather
information in some circumstances. The Court so far, however, has stopped
short of recognizing a comprehensive right to know that encompasses a right
to acquire government information. While it cannot be known whether and
how far the Court will ultimately move toward such recognition, several
members of the Court, as demonstrated above, have already indicated a
willingness to accord considerable weight to the right to know, extending it
to require the government to justify limitations on access to information
within the government's control.
B. Congress and the Executive
The other two branches of government, activated by the Supreme
Court's broad conception of the First Amendment and its place in our
democratic system, have not been as cautious as the judiciary in recognizing
a comprehensive right to know.'5 4
Congress took a major step in effectuating the public's right to know
when it enacted the Freedom of Information Act in 1966."'1 As indicated in
the legislative history, Congress was concerned that restriction of the flow of
information to the people endangered our democratic system of govern-
151. 297 U.S. at 247.
152. Id. at 250.
153. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-64 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Hennings, supra note 29, at 670.
154. Of course, this may be a manifestation of the possibility that the other two
branches of government are less responsible in their pronouncements, as under the doc-
trine of judicial supremacy the courts will usually have the last say anyway. See also
Forkosch, supra note 3, at 45-46.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) and 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp.
4, pt. 1, 1976).
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ment." 6 The act was intended to insure maximum public disclosure of
information held by various government agencies. It requires that all agency
records, except those specifically exempted in subsection (b) of the act, 5 ' be
made available to any member of the public who properly requests them. If
the request is denied, a suit can be brought in federal district court to compel
release of the material sought. Broad executive interpretations of the act's
nine exemptions, obstructive agency practices, and court decisions further
restricting disclosure under two of the exemptions, however, threaten to
make a "shambles" of the act.15 Recent corrective amendments hold some
promise of increasing the flow of information from the agencies and of more
fully effectuating the right to know.' 59
In a clear expression of executive recognition of the right to know,
President Johnson declared when signing the Freedom of Information Act:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: a
democracy works best when the people have all the information that the
156. "A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the in-
telligence of the electorate varies as the quality and quantity of its information varies. A
danger signal to our democratic society in the U.S. is the fact that such a political truism
needs repeating . . . . The repetition is necessary because the ideas of our democratic
society have outpaced the machinery which makes that society work. The needs of the
electorate have outpaced the laws which guarantee public access to the facts in govern-
ment." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2429. For the Senate Committee Report, see S. REP. No.
813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) as amended by 5 U.S.C.A. §
552(b) (West Supp. 4, pt. 1, 1976), provides for nine exemptions encompassing (1) na-
tional security matters, (2) internal personnel rules and practices, (3) statutory exemptions,
(4) trade secrets, (5) inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda, (6) matters of personal
privacy, (7) investigatory files, (8) financial institution records, and (9) geological infor-
mation concerning wells.
158. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 109 (1973) (Doug-
las, J. dissenting). See, e.g., Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967); Engel, Public Access to Information-Introduction: Informa-
tion Disclosure Policies and Practices of Federal Administrative Agencies, 68 Nw. U.L.
REV. 184 (1973); Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom,
of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261 (1970); Nader, Freedom of Information: The
Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, The Freedom of In-
formation Act-A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150 (1969). But see Clark,
Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE
L.J. 741 (1975).
159. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 4, pt. 1, 1976) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1970)); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)). See Clark,
Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE
L.J. 741 (1975); Comment, National Security and the Public's Right to Know: A New
Role for the Courts under the Freedom of Information Act, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1438
(1975) [hereinafter cited as National Security: New Role for Courts]; Statutory Comment,
Judicial Review of Classified Documents: Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act,
12 HARV. J. LEGis. 415 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Review].
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security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of
secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the
public interest ...
I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the United
States is an open society in which the people's right to know is cherished
and guarded.'
The continued secretiveness of the executive in the face of these fine expres-
sions of principle only highlights the most troublesome problems: given that
some right to know exists, what is its scope, and how is it to be effectuated?
IV. Scope of the Right to Know
A. Government's Power to Withhold Information
Before exploring the scope of the right to know it is useful initially to
examine the power of government to withhold information in the absence of
such a right. Because most government secrecy involves the executive
branch, the subject is usually discussed in terms of executive power and
often in terms, of executive versus congressional power. This note posits the
right to know as a constitutional right limiting the powers of government as a
whole; thus, it is necessary to consider not only the powers of the executive
and Congress individually, but the powers of both branches acting in con-
junction in such activities as congressionally authorized executive secrecy
under the Freedom of Information Act exemptions or under the espionage
statutes.161
The only time secrecy is mentioned in the Constitution is with regard to
the right of the houses of Congress to delete certain information from their
published journals.' 62 Nowhere is a general power to withhold information
expressly authorized.' 63 From the earliest days of the republic, however,
government officials have asserted the right and power to conceal informa-
tion,164 and it has generally been acknowledged that in certain circumstances
this assertion cannot realistically be denied. As a matter of public policy
160. Statement by President Johnson upon signing Public Law 89-487 (July 4,
1966), reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 263-64 (1968). For the more recent views of an
attorney general, see Levi, Confidentiality and Democratic Government, 30 REC.
N.Y.C.B.A. 323 (1975).
161. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-98 (1970).
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 quoted in note 88 supra.
163. The one reference to secrecy in the Constitution is a very specific and limited
authorization. The term "general power" is meant, in contradistinction, to refer to a
broader power, such as the power to regulate commerce, of wider application than simply
to the journals of the legislature.
164. For example, in 1790 President Washington submitted to the Senate under an
injunction of secrecy an article that was later to form part of a treaty with the Creek In-
dian Nation. FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LI-
BRARY OF CONGRESS, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AS A PROB-
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secrecy may, in certain instances and under adequate safeguards, be re-
quired for the public's safety and welfare.165 Disclosure of investigatory files
may spread false charges or alert a law violator in advance of prosecution.
166
Enormous amounts of information are voluntarily furnished to the govern-
ment by individuals and private organizations with the understanding that it
will be kept confidential. Disclosure of such information may infringe upon
the privacy of those involved and impair future government operations by
inhibiting the government's sources of information. 16 As the government
has expanded its economic regulatory activities, it has acquired information
that, if released prematurely, may have undesirable economic consequences
or may provide some with an unfair advantage over others.168 Disclosure of
information pertaining to intragovernmental communications may disrupt
the government's decisionmaking process, for officials exposed to personal
and political attack might refrain from fully and freely airing their views and
offering their advice in advance of a decision.' Foreign affairs, including
national military defense and foreign relations, is perhaps the most obvious
area requiring some secrecy, and for this reason the following examination
of the government's power to withhold information will focus on that area.
The Constitution is surprisingly sketchy about foreign affairs; indeed
there is no express power to conduct foreign relations.' While it can hardly
be questioned that the federal government has the power to maintain rela-
tions with other sovereign nations, the sources of this power remain elu-
sive.' Even less certain is the manner in which such power is distributed
among the branches of government. 2 For present purposes, however, a
LEM IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY 2 (Comm. Print 1971). Six
years later, in justifying his refusal to honor a request by the House of Representatives for
the documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty (Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Great
Britain, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105), Washington noted that the success of foreign negotia-
tions "must often depend upon secrecy." 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 194 (J. Richardson ed. 1897). See BERGER, supra note 16; A. BRECKENRIDGE,
THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974); Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional In-
quiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1044 (1965).
165. The Freedom of Information Act lists nine categories of information warrant-
ing secrecy. See note 157 supra.
166. Levi, Confidentiality and Democratic Government, 30 REC. N.Y.C.B.A. 323,
329 (1975); Parks, supra note 14, at 5.
167. ROURKE, supra note 107, at 14, 33-35, 102-03; Levi, Confidentiality and
Democratic Government., 30 REC. N.Y.C.B.A. 323, 324-29 (1975); Parks, supra note
14, at 5.
168. Parks, supra note 14, at 5; ROURKE, supra note 107, at 33-35, 49-50.
169. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); Parks, supra note 14, at
5.
170. See D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE IN A
NUTSHELL 216-19 (1974); HENKIN, supra note 45, at 15-28.
171. See D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE IN A
NUTSHELL 216-19 (1974); HENKIN, supra note 45, at 15-88.
172. See HENKIN, supra note 45, at 15-88.
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precise delineation of each branch's share of foreign affairs powers is un-
necessary; it will suffice to examine the broad outlines to discern the aggre-
gate power of the federal government as a whole.
Primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs rests with the
executive,' 73 although congressional powers overlap in some instances."'
The executive has claimed that the authority to withhold information is an
implied power stemming from the general grant of executive power,17 the
designation of the President as commander in chief,17 and the provision
stating that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted." '" Such authority, having been implied from the Constitution on the
ground of necessity, logically exists only when the necessity exists."'8 But
the courts have generally been quite liberal in finding such necessity, inter-
preting expressly granted powers to authorize "that which [is] reasonably
appropriate and relevant to the exercise of [the] granted power." '79 The
courts have been particularly liberal in the area of foreign affairs,180 but even
assuming a broad interpretation, the doctrine of implied powers has neces-
sary limitations.1 81 The executive, however, has not found it necessary to
rely solely on this doctrine as the source of its power.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(see quotation in text accompanying note 184 infra); HENKIN, supra note 45, at 37-65.
174. See notes 188-194 and accompanying text infra.
175. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
176. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
177. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This claim was made in REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY OF 1957, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1957). See
Note, Secrecy in the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations: Recent Policy and Prac-
tice, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 187, 197-98 (1973).
178. Implied and inherent powers are often discussed together with little regard for
their differences. In order to discover the nature and source of the power to withhold,
they are analyzed separately in this note. See generally 2 ANTIEAU, MODERN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW §§ 11:4 to -:6 (1969).
The necessary and proper clause, which has been liberally construed since McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), does not by its terms apply to the
executive. Indeed, its terms seem to preclude a concept of implied executive powers. The
clause provides that Congress shall have power "[tlo make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, .or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). See also
HENKIN, supra note 45, at 17-18. But, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
the Court observed that the "rule of constitutional interpretation announced in McCulloch
v. Maryland," which was based on the necessary and proper clause, had been "univer-
sally applied." Id. at 705 n.16. With this, the Court found certain implied powers and
privileges to flow from the nature of the executive's article II powers. Id.
179. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.16 (1974) (quoting Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 537 (1917)).
180. See notes 196-97 and accompanying text infra.
181. See Henkin, supra note 45, at 15-19. See also Wright v. United States, 302
U.S. 583, 588 (1938); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain powers are inhe-
rent in the very nature of a general government, 18 and nowhere is this more
evident than in the field of foreign affairs. In the leading case of United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ," while expounding the theory of
inherent powers, the Court accorded to the President the lion's share of
power over the conduct of foreign relations:
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they
had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality ....
In this vast external realm [of foreign affairs], with its . . . delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation ....
• . .[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations
184
In Curtiss-Wright, the Court acknowledged the need for secrecy and implied
that the President possessed the power to withhold information concerning
foreign affairs."8 5 The existence of such a power has since been more
explicitly confirmed.186 Thus, while the executive's implied power may
encompass only that information reasonably requiring secrecy in order to
enable the executive effectively to exercise its enumerated or established
powers, the theory of inherent powers provides the executive with an un-
182. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 556 (1871).
183. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
184. Id. at 318-20. The Court's extended discussion of inherent powers is largely
dictum. A joint resolution of Congress had authorized the President to embargo arms to
the countries at war in the Chaco and had imposed criminal penalties for violating such an
embargo. President Roosevelt proclaimed an embargo and the defendant company, in-
dicted for violating it, challenged the resolution and the proclamation as an improper de-
legation of legislative power to the President. Sustaining the indictment, the Court held
that principles limiting delegation in domestic affairs do not apply equally in foreign af-
fairs.
Justice Sutherland's opinion and the theory of inherent powers have not been unani-
mously acclaimed. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 16, at 100-0; HENKIN, supra note
45, at 19-27; Goldberg, The Constitutional Limitations on the President's Powers, 22
AM. U.L. REV. 667 (1973); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr.
Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
185. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
186. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-11 (1974); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730, 744-45, 761 (1971); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1965); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc., v. Waterman, 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
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defined and therefore seemingly unlimited authority to withhold informa-
tion, particularly in the area of foreign affairs.18
The government need not solely rely on the executive's authority,
however, in its efforts to conceal information. Whatever power the execu-
tive mat lack, Congress is empowered by the Constitution to supply the
complement. Several of the legislative powers enumerated in the Constitu-
tion touch on foreign affairs.' 88 In addition, Congress is vested with a portion
of the unenumerated foreign affairs powers inherent in national sov-
ereignty.' 89 Finally, Congress has the power: "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.'I The neces-
sary and proper clause provides Congress with broad powers over foreign
affairs '9 by authorizing Congress to carry out not only its own powers but
those of the executive as well.' 9 ' Since Chief Justice Marshall's famous
pronouncement in McCulloch v. Maryland,'9' this clause has been broadly
construed to require only that the legislation be reasonably appropriate and
relevant to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution.' 94
B. Role of the Right to Know
The powers allocated to Congress, of course, limit the powers of the
executive, and vice versa, but considered together and in the absence of a
right to know, these two branches of government possess practically unli-
mited power to conceal information from the public. 9' The judiciary is
187. Hennings, supra note 29, at 769-70, effectively argues that "[s]ince the power
[to withhold] is implied as a necessary corollary to some other power, it may be exercised
only when the effective exercise of some other power requires it," but he fails adequately
to account for the theory of inherent powers, lumping even Curtiss-Wright ander his im-
plied power analysis.
188. These include the powers to regulate commerce with foreign nations (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3), to define and punish piracies, felonies committed on the high
seas, and offenses against the law of nations (id., cl. 10), to declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water (id., cl. 11),
and other general powers that are indispensable to the conduct of foreign relations, such
as the power to tax and to spend for the common defense and general welfare (id., cl. I),
and to appropriate funds from the treasury (id., § 9, cl. 7). See HENKIN, supra note 45,
at 67-88.
189. See HENKIN, supra noie 45, at 68, 74-76.
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
191. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
192. See HENKIN, supra note 45, at 78.
193. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
194. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 537 (1917).
195. It is not clear precisely to what extent each branch can limit the other's power
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unlikely to impose limits. Absent a question of infringement of individual
rights, the courts have generally adopted a deferential policy regarding
action in the field of foreign affairs.19 The Supreme Court has never invali-
dated a statute, treaty, or executive act intimately related to foreign affairs
on the ground that it was beyond the power of the federal government; in
light of the expansive interpretation of the Constitution since the New Deal,
it is doubtful the Court will do so in the near future.
19 7
When the Constitution was written, the federal government was small.
Keeping track of information in and about the government--except for
secret diplomatic correspondence-presented no great problem to those in-
terested." 8 Today, however, with a vast bureaucracy that could hardly have
been envisioned in 1789, the implications of an unlimited power to withhold
information are ominous. The recent experiences of this nation demonstrate
that it is entirely conceivable that such a power
could be used in a way that would destroy government by consent, the
separation of powers, checks and balances, and the creative and discipli-
nary role of free inquiry. A general power to withhold and to centralize in
a small top political directorate the giving out of information. . . could
become the Achilles' heel of the American Constitution as was the
Emergency Clause of the Weimar Constitution. 9
Since the mid-1930's, the courts have increasingly extended the protections
of the Bill of Rights, while on the other hand generally leaving governmen-
tal powers free to expand. When the exercise of power clashes with indi-
vidual rights, the courts have been more willing to scrutinize the government
activity, even though it may be in the field of foreign affairs."' 0 As noted in
to withhold information. The scope of executive privilege is still largely an open question.
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), discussed in 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1 (1974); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 408 F. Supp. 321 (1976),
prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct. 483 (1976). Given the propensity of the executive to exag-
gerate national security fears and to indulge in excessive secrecy (Developments-
National Security, supra note 24, at 1134-1215), and of Congress generally to follow the
executive's foreign policy lead (E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 185 (1957)), it is impor-
tant to consider the possibility that the two branches will combine their powers to conceal
from the public rather than to check each other. The seriousness of this possibility has
been evidenced by a proposal recently under consideration by Congress. Certain provi-
sions of the proposed federal criminal code relating to espionage and disclosure of na-
tional defense and classified information would significantly broaden the scope of such
crimes and provide the executive for the first time with the power to use criminal sanc-
tions to enforce its secrecy system. S. 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 1121-24 (1973).
196. B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, 2 THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT § 210 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ].
197. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 26-27, 208.
198. See note 98 supra.
199. Parks, supra note 14, at 10-11. See Gillers, Secret Government and What To
Do About It, I CIV. LIB. REV. 68 (1974). See generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 13.
200. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 205-10, 251-66; SCHWARTZ, supra note 196, at
§§ 210-11.
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,201 the inherent powers of the
federal government, and particularly the President's power in foreign af-
fairs, are subject to constitutional limitations. The President's power "of
course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordi-
nation to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.'"'20
The right to know thus assumes a position of vital importance, for aside
from the political checks imposed by the separation of powers and the
American people, such a right stands as the only major constitutional limita-
tion of the power to withhold information."0 3 Given that a right to know of
some dimensions must exist,2"4 the major remaining question is what re-
straining effect it should have on the otherwise seemingly unlimited power
to withhold.
C. Scope Derived from the Foundations
A search for the scope of an implied or inherent right most logically
begins with a re-examination of foundations upon which the right rests. The
reasons for inferring the existence of the right may also provide some insight
into the scope of the right. The first foundation is that the right to know is
essential to the proper functioning of a system of self-government. 05 This is
a compelling argument for some right because it is predicated on necessity.
The apparent basis for determining the scope of the right would be the extent
of the necessity. Logically, then, the right to know would be coextensive
with the people's need for information. Need, however, is not a simple
question of absolutes. It is usually a matter of degree ranging from that
which is vital to that which is merely useful or convenient. Any standard
based on need will therefore be inherently vague and susceptible of wide
disagreement about its application. Moreover, it should be recognized that
self-government is an ideal that can be only imperfectly achieved in the real
world; for all practical purposes, it too is a matter of degree. The extent of
the people's need for information will depend upon how fully and actively
they are to participate in the governing process; yet by gauging the need for
201. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
202. Id. at 320. The Court later restated the principle more explicitly and applied it
to the powers of Congress as well: "Broad as the power in the National Government to
regulate foreign affairs must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The restrictions
confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the
Constitution apply with equal vig6r when that body seeks to regulate our relations with
other nations." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958) (overruled on other grounds in
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)).
203. The political checks, moreover, are caught up in a vicious circle that raises
doubts about their efficacy. It is the very exercise of the power to withhold that, by deny-
ing Congress and the people needed information, renders these checks less able and less
likely to function effectively. See Introduction and section I of this Note supra; note 195
and accompanying text supra.
204. See sections II & III of this Note supra.
205. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
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information, one is, in effect, determining the extent of the people's partici-
pation in government.2 6 Need, then, is a standard without a reference point
and involves no less than deciding just how self-governing the people are to
be.
The second foundation is that the right to know follows logically and
necessarily from the idea that a sovereign people formed the government to
serve them. 27 The precise scope of the right is not apparent in the mandate
of sovereignty. It would appear to be an absolute right,"'8 but perhaps only
because a simple statement of the principle fails to indicate how the govern-
ment is to serve the people. For instance, the people may have agreed when
forming the government that they should not know what could not be told
them without damage to the public interest. The principle of popular
sovereignty does, however, aim the search in a promising direction. While a
standard based on need tends to build the right from the ground up, the
principle of popular sovereignty begins by encompassing all government
information within the scope of the people's right to know; thus, any ad-
justment can only be downward. This is the approach of the Freedom of
Information Act,209 an approach popularly taken simply out of recognition
of the fact that ours is basically an open society in which secrecy is the
exception.
The third foundation establishes the right to know as a logical corollary
of the government's theoretically limited power to withhold.210 Since such a
right is designed to fill a void and prevent the power from spilling over its
legitimate boundaries, the obvious assumption is that the people should have
a right to know at least all that they have not authorized the government to
withhold from them. Perhaps at one time this approach was plausible, but
since the Supreme Court has largely ceased to define the outer limits of the
federal government's powers and has accepted the theory of inherent
sovereign power in the area of foreign affairs, to define the right to know in
terms of the government's limited power to withhold would be meaningless.
While the third foundation is a doctrinally sound basis for recognizing the
existence of the right to know, it is of little help in determining the scope of
that right.
The fourth foundation is the First Amendment, which, as indicated
206. See FREE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 3-4.
207. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
208. Indeed, much of the early discussion of the right to know apparently revolved
around whether it was an absolute right. See, e.g., Mardian, What Should the People
Know?, 8 TRIAL 16 (Mar./Apr. 1972); Parks, supra note 14, at 4-5; Philos, The Public's
Right to Know and the Public Interest-A Dilemma Revisited, 19 FED. B.J. 41 (1959);
Rogers, The Right to Know Government Business from the Viewpoint of the Government
Official, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 83 (1956).
209. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975), as amended by 5 U.S.C.A. § 552
(West Supp. 4, pt. 1, 1976).
210. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra.
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earlier, can be interpreted in a number of ways: literally, based on a strict
construction,21' broadly, based on evidence of the framers' intent,2"2 or
functionally, based on the general purpose of the amendment.2 1' The right to
know follows as a necessary corollary of the literal interpretation in order to
enable the people intelligently to exercise their rights to speak and to pub-
lish. Apparently the right should encompass all government information
needed for that purpose. This approach, however, suffers from the same
difficulties as those encountered above in attempting to define the right to
know in terms of the people's need for information. Similarly, the functional
analysis is concerned with effectuating the broad purpose of the First
Amendment, to protect such free discussion and activity as is necessary to
prepare the people to fulfill their role in a system of self-government. This,
too, suggests defining the scope of the right in terms of need. The-intent of
the framers raises different problems. While ample evidence points to some
right to know, only a portion of this evidence addresses the issue of the
scope of that right. The documentation is insufficient to verify the precise
extent of the right to know-envisioned by the framers. With that caveat in
mind, it is nevertheless clear that the framers regarded the right to know as
basic to self-government, so it is unlikely they would be niggardly with the
scope of its protection. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that the
framers expected and intended government secrecy to be strictly cir-
cumscribed to those instances in which it is necessary in the public interest,
such as during war and treaty negotiations.2 14 Presumably, information of all
other types of governmental affairs was thought to fall within the compass of
the people's right to know.215
On the basis of what can be gleaned from the foundations, the people's
right to know includes at least what the people need to know, nebulous as
that is, and above that the people have a right to know all government
information whose nondisclosure would serve no public interest. Obviously
this formulation is inadequate, for it fails to indicate where to draw the line
above the minimal need to know in order to delineate the proper exercise of
the power to withhold. From all available indications, the framers would
probably draw the line at the point where, as Madison put it, secrecy be-
comes necessary because the information involves "important transactions,
the publication of which might be detrimental to the community.''26 The
scope of the right to know should not and need not, however, be predicated
solely on this rather narrow ground. Because the right to know is a constitu-
tional right and is based at least partially on the First Amendment, further
211. See notes 45-50 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 5 1-101 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 102-08 and accompanying text supra.
214. See notes 90-96 and accompanying text supra.
215. See note 93 supra.
216. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 409.
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guidance is provided by the judicial treatment of other First Amendment
interests.
D. Scope Derived from First Amendment Principles
One of the primary stumbling blocks to judicial development of the
right to know has been the difficulty of formulating an appropriate standard
for judicial review of governmental decisions to withhold information. The
need to balance the public interest in knowing what the government is doing
against the necessity of secrecy in certain areas of government is widely
recognized, but where and how the balance should be struck is the subject of
much disagreement. 17 This problem is not peculiar to the right to know; the
Supreme Court has long struggled to develop a workable formula by which
to determine the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment.
There are actually two points at which the courts must apply standards.
To illustrate, the Freedom of Information Act directs the courts to determine
whether national security information is properly withheld based on the
criteria established by executive orderY.2 8 The courts must employ some
standard, such as reasonableness, in deciding whether the executive has
correctly applied its own criteria.2"9 A separate standard must be applied by
the court initially, however, to determine whether the criteria established by
the executive are constitutionally adequate. 2 If they are not, the court
should not reach the issue of their reasonable application. It is the standard
by which the executive criteria themselves are evaluated that is the focus of
inquiry here.
Whatever may be the correct standard, it is clear that if the government
uses no criteria at all-' 'if the determination of government secrecy is made
by executive fiat upon no principled ground-then such determination can-
not pass constitutional muster. ' '22  The Supreme Court considers it well
settled that any law that "makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which
the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an
217. Few contend that the people have a right to know everything and that the gov-
ernment is powerless to conceal information in the public interest. Generally rejected, too,
is the opposite extreme, that once the legislature or executive decides to keep a document
secret all First Amendment inquiry by the courts is ended. See. e.g., Mardian, What
Should the People Know?, 8 TRIAL 16 (Mar./Apr. 1972); Nimmer, National Security Se-
crets v. Free Speech: Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV.
311, 328 (1974); Parks, supra note 14, at 4-5.
218. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
219. The original Senate bill amending the Freedom of Information Act contained
such a reasonableness standard, but fears that it was not a sufficiently stringent test led to
its deletion in favor of judicially developed standards. See National Security: New Role
for Courts, supra note 159, at 1447-50; Judicial Review, supra note 159, at 434-35.
220. This would apply equally to congressionally established criteria.
221. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: Issues Left Undecided in
the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 329 (1974).
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official . . .is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the
enjoyment of those freedoms." 222 Anything less than this minimal require-
ment would constitute an abdication of the judiciary's duty to preserve First
Amendment rights, for Congress or the executive could easily avoid any
meaningful judicial review of government decisions to conceal information
by the simple expedient of eliminating the criteria for making such deci-
sions.
The right to know also dictates that the criteria evidence some degree of
specificity. Otherwise they could be framed in such broad and general terms
as to be no criteria at all. In other First Amendment contexts, the Court has
generally demanded a stricter than normal standard of permissible vague-
ness;223 there is no apparent reason to demand less when the right to know is
at stake. "Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms," '224 because the free dissemi-
nation of information and ideas might otherwise suffer. 25
The crucial question in balancing the public interest in knowledge
against the need for secrecy is where to set the scale. How much must the
state's interest in secrecy weigh to offset the people's interest in knowledge?
While secrecy is often vital to the security of the nation and is occasionally
accompanied by a senseof urgency, 2 ' the continuous, unceasing need for
public information is no less fundamental. Indeed, as former Chief Justice
Earl Warren stated when assessing claims of national defense:
[T]his concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in itself,
justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a
goal. Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending
those values and ideals which set this Nation apart. For almost two
centuries, our country has taken singular pride in the democratic ideals
enshrined in its Constitution, and the most cherished of those ideals have
found expression in the First Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in
the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of
those liberties . ..which makes the defense of the Nation worth-
while.22 '
Moreover, national security and disclosure of information are not totally
irreconcilable interests. Ultimately, the security of the nation lies in the
proper functioning of the system of self-government. Justice Hughes ex-
pressed the same thought in De Jonge v. Oregon,228 in which the Court held
that a person could not be punished for attending a meeting run by Com-
munists:
222. Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).
223. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
224. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
225. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
226. See notes 165-69 and accompanying text supra.
227. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
228. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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[I]mperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of
free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the oppor-
tunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be
obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government. 29
Inevitably circumstances will arise in which the people's right to know
will clash with genuine needs for secrecy. In such situations the public
interest in information, while perhaps not the "breath of civilization it-
self,"2 3 can hardly be overemphasized. It should not be sacrificed unless
secrecy is necessary to the proper exercise of the powers of government.
Any standard or test designed to draw the line between the power to with-
hold and the right to know should reflect this fundamental principle by
incorporating some reference to the necessity for concealment in any given
context. While a simple standard or test of necessity or essentiality would be
inherently vague and probably unworkable,2 3 ' the idea of necessity should
be the underlying theme of any more sophisticated standard or test. 32 To
lose sight of this principle and to adopt a formula based on convenience,
expediency, or anything less than necessity, is to sacrifice too cheaply the
people's constitutional right to know and to sell short the ideal of self-
government. The right to know should not be limited unless essential to the
furtherance of a substantial and compelling state interest. Insistence that
restrictions of the right be justified by such a standard would coincide with
the treatment generally accorded other important First Amendment rights.233
229. Id. at 365.
230. Parks, supra note 14, at 4.
231. See text accompanying notes 205-06 supra.
232. The idea of necessity to be incorporated into a comprehensive standard or test
(see, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (196S), quoted in note 233
infra) is meant to be distinguished from a simple standard or test asking only whether it is
necessary to withhold certain information or whether secrecy is essential in a specific
case.
233. "To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear,
the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinat-
ing; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it
clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is ,vithin the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1968) (footnotes omitted). While First Amendment rights do not enjoy an expressly
"preferred status" as they did in the forties and fifties, they are "still treated somewhat
more tenderly than, if not given such an exalted or preferred position over, the others."
Forkosch, supra note 3, at 57-58.
Justice Powell argued in his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974): " 'there are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow.' . . . [But at] some point official restraints
on access to news sources, even though not directed solely at the press, may so under-
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V. Role of the Judiciary
"[T]he mere formulation of a relevant Constitutional principle is the
beginning of the solution of a problem, not its answer.''2 34 Considerable
disagreement surrounds the role of the courts in reviewing decisions to
withhold information by either of the other governmental branches. The
means of applying the right to know and who is to have responsibility for its
effectuation are matters of vital importance, for they will in large part
determine the forcefulness of the right.
With the right to know on a constitutional footing, protection of the
right naturally falls within the special competence of the judiciary "as
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. '235 This does not mean the other
branches are relegated to secondary positions in balancing the people's need
to know against the need for secrecy. Indeed, the general policies and daily
practices of those branches will be crucial in determining how open our
society is to be. But judicial review of executive and congressional decisions
is essential if the right to know is to have any force at all. Vesting in the
self-interested political branches unbridled discretion to withhold informa-
tion would only encourage government secrecy.236 A right so fundamental
mine the function of the First Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to
require the government to justify such regulations in terms more compelling than discre-
tionary authority and administrative convenience. It is worth repeating our admonition in
Branzburg that 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.' "Id. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in which the issue
was whether the government could prevent dissemination of information by enjoining pub-
lication, the government suggested that the standard should be whether disclosure posed a
grave and irreparable danger to national security. Brief for the United States, in 2 THE
NEW YoRK TIMES CO. V. UNITED STATES, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1166-67
(1971). The Times suggested that prior restraint can be permitted "only in circumstances
where a publication will directly and immediately cause, by a probability amounting to a
certainty, a grave and disastrous breach in the security of the country." Brief for The
Times, id. at 1147. Justices Stewart and White applied a standard of whether disclosure
"will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people." 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971). Justice Brennan would require "proof that publica-
tion must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to
imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea . . . ." Id. at 726-27.
234. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
235. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
236. "Professor Wade, an acute observer of the English administrative scene, cal-
led the 'civil servant' occupational love of secrecy, the 'official instinct of hiding as much
as possible from the public gaze.' " BERGER, supra note 16, at 214 (1974), (quoting H.
WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 18 (2d ed. 1967)). "The English experience . . . de-
monstrated that whenever the bureaucracy is 'given a blank cheque,' it unfailingly yields
'to the temptation to overdraw,' as is confirmed by our own experience." Berger, The
Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 28 (1974) (quoting H.
WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285 (2d ed. 1967)). See EMERSON, supra note 14, at
16-25; Developments-National Security, supra note 24, at 1201-02, 1219; Access to
Official Information, supra note 29, at 215-17.
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as the right to know cannot be left to such fickle guardians.237
The scheme of a separation of powers presupposes that the judiciary
should have some power to compel the other branches to produce informa-
tion. The doctrine of separation of powers was designed in conjunction with
a system of checks and balances to preserve the integrity and independence
of each of the branches of government so that no one of them would be able
to monopolize political power. But an executive branch with uncontrolled
discretion to withhold information about its activities could achieve such a
monopoly by "operat[ing] behind a curtain of secrecy, relatively free from
the checks of legislative inquiry, judicial review, and public opinion."'23
The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Reynolds2 39 that
"complete abandonment of judicial control would lead to intolerable
abuses." 4 ' In that case the widows of civilian observers who had crashed
on a military plane carrying secret electronic equipment moved for produc-
tion of the Air Force's investigation report. The Court recognized the exis-
tence of an evidentiary privilege for military secrets. It warned, however,
that " [j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers. "241 "The court itself must determine whether
the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege .... ",242 On
the basis of the government's formal claim of privilege, a supporting
affidavit, and judicial notice that "this is a time of vigorous preparation for
national defense,''243 the Court sustained the withholding of the report,
deeming inspection of it unnecessary to determine whether military secrets
were at stake.
, The question of the court's proper role in dealing with claims of execu-
tive privilege arose recently in connection with the special prosecutor's
efforts to obtain recordings of White House conversations relevant to inves-
tigation of the Watergate affair. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Nixon,244 confronted with "a broad claim that the separation of powers
doctrine precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege,"
conceded that "each branch of the Government must initially interpret the
237. "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assem-
bly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the out-
come of no elections." West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943).
238. Developments-National Security, supra note 24, at 1219.
239. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
240. Id. at 8.
241. Id. at 9-10.
242. Id. at 8.
243. Id. at 10.
244. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great
respect from the others."21 45 Nevertheless the Court reasserted its position
"as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution," which requires that it "on
occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construc-
tion given the document by another branch. 24 Deeming its conclusion
compelled by "the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and
balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government,""' the Court
reaffirmed that "it is the province and duty of this Court 'to say what the law
is' with respect to the claim of privilege .... "'I'
President Nixon's next contention in effect asked the Court to say that
as a matter of constitutional law the executive privilege to withhold informa-
tion is absolute and unqualified, "that the independence of the Executive
Branch within its own sphere . . . insulates a President from a judicial
subpoena." '249 Recalling that in designing the tripartite structure of our
government the framers "sought to provide a comprehensive system [in
which] the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute
independence," the Court rejected the absolute privilege because it "would
upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely
impair the role of the courts under Art. II." 5 '
The Court proceeded to balance the competing interests and concluded
that "the generalized interest in confidentiality . . . cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.''251
Carefully pointing out, however, that the claim of privilege in this case did
not involve military or diplomatic secrets-'"areas of Art. II duties [in
which] the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presiden-
tial responsibilities"' 252-the Court intimated that a simple claim of national
security would preclude in camera inspection.253
In terms of their implications for the role of the courts in effectuating
the right to know, Reynolds and Nixon are important primarily for their
recognition of the need for the judiciary to exercise control over executive
discretion. Of course, both cases involved requests by interested parties for
245. Id. at 703.
246. Id. at 704.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 705.
249. Id. at 706 (citations omitted).
250. Id. at 707.
251. Id. at 713.
252. Id. at 710.
253. "Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national
security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by
production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district
court will be obliged to provide." Id. at 706.
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information relevant to ongoing judicial proceedings, rather than an ordinary
citizen's request for information about some aspect of his government's
operations. But regardless of the context, both opinions establish the power
of the judiciary to review executive decisions to withhold information and it
is on the basis of this principle that the courts can assume an active role in
effectuating the right to know. While the reluctance of the courts to confront
the executive on the uncertain territory of military and foreign affairs is
understandable, 54 it logically would be inconsistent to abdicate to the cap-
rice of executive officers in any right to know case, including those involv-
ing claims of national security.25 It is not inconceivable that cases may arise
in which the court could satisfy itself that nondisclosure is appropriate
without inspecting the matter claimed to be privileged. But this determina-
tion should be made on a case-by-case basis;256 a blanket rule excepting
claims of national security from judicial scrutiny would only invite abuse. 57
Congress has recently recognized thai the courts have been too deferen-
tial to executive claims of national security under the classified information
exemption of the Freedom of Information Act.25 s The courts had severely
limited de novo review of such claims by declining to inspect the contested
documents in camera and the scope of review had been restricted to the
254. For discussion of judicial reluctance, see Henkin, supra note 45, at 205-24,
251-70; Kalijarvi & Wallace, supra note 12, at 483-85; SCHWARTZ, supra note 196, at
§§ 210-11; National Security: New Role for Courts, supra note 159, at 1451-62; Judicial
Review, supra note 159, at 437-43.
255. Cf. SCHWARTZ, supra note 196, at § 211 (distinguishing between judicial
treatment of foreign affairs cases involving individual rights from those not involving such
rights).
256. The case-by-case approach is entirely consistent with language in Reynolds,
part of which was quoted in Nixon: "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot
be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that
the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of
privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satist\ the court, from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evi-
dence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not
be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the
court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insist-
ing upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers." United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953) (emphasis added).
Depending on the level of scrutiny required to satisfy a court of the "reasonable
danger," this language could portend a judicial retreat from examination of national secu-
rity claims or it could merely point out that in cases where the reasonable danger is al-
ready evident, it is unnecessary for the court to probe further. See Karst & Horowitz,
Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 47, 64 & n.94
(1974).
257. See Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4,
26-29 (1974); Developments-National Security, supra note 24, at 1222-23.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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question whether the classification decision was arbitrary or capricious.259 In
order to encourage the courts to play a more aggressive enforcement role and
actively to involve themselves in reviewing government exemption claims,
Congress amended the act in 1974 explicitly to require de novo review of
agency decisions to withhold requested material and to permit in camera
inspection at the court's discretion.26' The scope of review was expanded to
require the court to reach its own independent judgment about whether the
material was properly classified under the executive's criteria.26' The
amendments clearly authorize more active judicial participation, but it is
largely left to the courts to determine how rigorously they will examine
agency refusals to disclose information. How eagerly the courts will respond
to the congressional invitation is uncertain, but it is reasonable to predict
that, as a result of the congressional stimulus, the judicial role will expand
somewhat in the future.
Perhaps the courts would be less hesitant to examine executive deci-
sions tp withhold national defense and foreign policy information if a con-
stitutional right to know were injected into the constitutional equation.26 2
The added responsibility of safeguarding such a right would provide the
judiciary with a solid ground for insisting that the need for nondisclosure be
fully demonstrated. Through the Freedom of Information Act, Congress has
provided the courts with a much needed procedural framework within which
many claims of a right to know can be adjudicated. But to the extent that the
act authorizes the courts to use particular powers and procedures that they
ordinarily would refrain from using, those powers and procedures cannot be
considered fixed components of the judiciary's protective role. Neverthe-
less, as the courts grow accustomed to scrutinizing executive claims of the
need for secrecy under the Freedom of Information Act, they can be ex-
pected to shed some of their reluctance to confront the executive on national
defense and foreign policy matters and to expand their notion of the proper
judicial role even absent supplementary statutory direction. 26 3
When the right to know is denied, the courts should be quick to recog-
nize that the very process of self-government is threatened. Judicial defer-
259. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir. 1970).
260. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V. 1975). For discussion of congressional in-
tent in amending the act, see National Security: New Role for Courts, supranote 159, at
1447-50.
261. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
262. This would be consistent with the Court's tendency to be more willing to
scrutinize foreign affairs actions alleged to violate individual rights. See text accompany-
ing note 200 supra.
263. Cf. Henkin, supra note 45, at 272-73. This assumes that the congressional
grants of general jurisdiction remain in place. The judicial role in the face of congres-
sional withdrawal of jurisdiction is much more problematic. The authority of Congress to
regulate the jurisdiction of and the remedies available in the courts, and hence to control
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ence to the decisions of the political branches of government is in many
instances a wise and necessary policy; judicial review does not mean "gov-
ernment by judiciary."264 But where the foundation of democratic govern-
ment is at stake, the courts should not hesitate to fulfill their "constitutional
obligation to keep it possible for the people to govern themselves." 65
Conclusion
Since the 1930's the federal government has grown tremendously, and
since World War H, has conducted its business in increasing secrecy.
Americans have recently been shocked to discover what their government
has been doing without their knowledge, and as a result, the United States is
today confronted with a somewhat alienated and distrustful populace-an
unhealthy condition for any democratic system. Some have questioned
whether self-government can long survive in an era of big government and
global hostility.2 6 While the need for occasional secrecy is apparent, and
the administrative costs of effectuating the right to know in a complex
modern society are no doubt great, these complications do not warrant
abandoning basic democratic principles.
The most significant potential application of the right to know lies in
acquiring withheld government information. Of the variety of contexts in
which the right could be asserted, perhdps the most obvious is a challenge to
the constitutionality of an agency's invocation of one of the Freedom of
Information Act exemptions to deny a citizen's request for information.
Unless nondisclosure could be justified as necessary to further a compelling
state interest, the citizen's right to know should prevail. The act's exemp-
tions thus would be circumscribed by the constitutional right to know.2"7 If
the circumstances in which they can exercise judicial review, is an unsettled area of con-
stitutional law. While congressional power is undoubtedly broad, the limitations on this
power have not been clearly defined. See generally HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 309-434 (2d ed. 1973).
264. See HENKIN, supra note 45, at 206.
265. Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption's Ally, 60 A.B.A.J. 550, 552
(1974). Charles Curtis, in his study of the Supreme Court, Lions Under the Throne, main-
tains that "license becomes a virtue when the legislature attacks the democratic process
itself, as it does when it restricts the right to vote, prohibits peacable assembly, interferes
with political organizations, restrains the dissemination of information. All these, as Stone
said, require 'more exacting judicial scrutiny' than the general prohibitions of Due Proc-
ess. And surely this is obvious, so much so the Court has more often acted than spoken
on the principle. Some of these examples are the subject of specific prohibition in the Bill
of Rights, but it is their effect upon the democratic process that justifies the more exacting
scrutiny, not the fact that they have been more specifically prohibited and seem therefore
easier to apply. '. . . [W]here the democratic process is itself attacked, the Court should
exercise less than no restraint." C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 328 (1947)
(emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
266. See, e.g., CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY: THE NEXT TEN YEARS (R.
Hutchins ed. 1963); R. DAHL & E. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973); C. FRAN-
KEL, THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT (1962).
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no compelling state interest can be offered to support the exemption as a
whole, or if the exemption cannot be shown to be necessary to further such
an interest, it should be invalidated on its face.268 Moreover, the courts may,
as they do in other situations when First Amendment interests are
threatened, invalidate an exemption that can be justified in some cases but,
by its terms, sweeps too broadly into protected areas.269
Other possible applications of the right to know abound. It could be
used when the government attempts to interfere with the flow of information
and ideas by applying sanctions directly against recipients rather than
against communicators. Such sanctions have not been common in our soci-
ety, but they are not inconceivable; indeed, recent proposals to codify the
federal criminal law have included penalties for mere receipt of classified
information.' The right to know could also provide effective protection
against government interference with communication in situations where the
communicator is unable to assert his right or, if he is able, fails to do so.
Ultimately, the constitutional right to know holds the promise of help-
ing to maintain a relatively open society in which self-government remains
possible. Of course, the people's desire to participate, the political attitudes
of the day, and the good will of those in government will largely determine
the ultimate success of efforts to operate the government openly. But at-
titudes can change, and freedom of information acts can be repealed; ac-
knowledgement and enforcement of the constitutional right to know can help
restore and maintain the healthy balance of power between citizens and
government.
267. There has already been some movement toward narrowly drawing and constru-
ing particular exemptions in congruence with the interests served by that exemption.
Mindful of the policies underlying the inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda exemp-
tion, the courts have limited the reach of that exemption, subjecting some documents
fairly characterizable as memoranda to disclosure if withholding would serve no substan-
tial policy interest. Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven Year Assessment, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 895, 937-41 (1974); Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the
Exemption for Intra-agency Memoranda, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1047 (1973). In contrast, it
was Congress that narrowed the investigatory files exemption to counteract expansive
court interpretations. The amended exemption permits nondisclosure only when production
of the information would invade someone's personal privacy or would impinge on spec-
ified policy interests, such as interference with enforcement proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975); S. REP. NQ. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974).
268. The right to know would thus preclude Congress from creating an exemption
for all government information relating to, for example, federal school lunch programs or
interstate highways.
269. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 844 (1970).
270. See S. 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 1121-24 (1973). Sanctions against reci-
pients, although uncommon, are not unknown. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). For a discussion of the
various areas in which the right to know could usefully be applied, see Emerson, Legal
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH U.L.Q. I.
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